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Public corporations are under immense pressure to re-direct  resourc  towards 
maximizing the value that accrues to non-shareholding stakeholders of the irm. 
Stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, government, media and the 
community at large, continually put pressure on firms to improve the corporate social 
(including environmental) performance (CSP). But do increased stakeholder demands 
result in subsequent improvements in  firms’ CSP?  In this dissertation, I argue that 
stakeholder pressure (SP) is successful in enhancing the corporation’s sensitivity to 
stakeholder issues through improvements in the stakeholder governance mechanisms – 
institutions that safeguard stakeholder interests and maximize stak holder welfare – 
within the firm. Using advanced panel-data analysis techniques, I confirm that 
stakeholder pressure is successful in influencing firms to improve weaknesses in 
stakeholder governance mechanisms. I also introduce the role of manageri l disc etion 
in devising and influencing stakeholder governance mechanisms. I propose and find that 
stakeholder pressure is less effective in strengthening stakeholder governance 
mechanisms in organizational and environmental contexts where managers h v  more 
room to exercise discretion. Further, stakeholder governance mechanisms partially 
mediate the relationship between stakeholder pressure and subsequent CSP.  
In the second part of the study, I focus on the practical implications of 
discretionary managerial spending on corporate financial performance (CFP). 
Stakeholder theory contends that when firms are receptive to stakeholders’ demands 
they can also increase the value accrued to the firms’ shareholders. According to this 
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view, it is possible for a firm to enhance simultaneously both its CSP and its CFP. Yet, 
after nearly two decades of research on this topic, researchers are divided on the exact 
nature of the CSP-CFP relationship. I introduce the role of managers in appropriating 
the benefits arising out of CSP. I propose and test a set of models that include contexts 
in which managers exercise discretion as moderators of the relationship between CSP 
and CFP. Results indicate that when rigorous empirical testing i  conducted, the CSP-
CFP relationship ceases to be statistically significant and is not moderated by 
managerial discretion contexts. 
Finally, I re-investigate the link between CSP and CFP with a particular 
emphasis on the discretionary nature of CSP spending. Firms may choose to invest in 
CSP due to a variety of endogenous pressures, and if there is evidence of self-selection 
by firms to pursue social performance, omission of these antecedents of CSP from an 
analysis of the CSP-CFP relationship may provide inconsistent resul s. I propose that 
researchers investigating the link between CSP and CFP need to correct not only for the 
endogeneity due to omitted variables, but also for the endogeneity of a firm’s decision 
to engage in CSP.  I employ statistical corrections for selection model issues to re-
estimate the CSP-CFP link using stakeholder pressure as a predictor of a firm’s decision 
to engage in CSP. I find that once sample selection errors are fixed, CSP is indeed 
positively related to CFP. Implications, directions for future research and possible 







Public corporations are under increasing amounts of pressure from society at 
large to re-direct resources towards the value-maximization of other constituents 
besides shareholders (Donaldson, 1982). Indeed, in a recent survey, “three-fourths 
(74%) of Americans say, now more than ever, businesses must show leadership, 
courage and commitment in keeping corporate citizenship among the top business 
priorities” (GolinHarris, 2009). In order to ensure that companies do keep corporate 
citizenship as one of their goals, secondary stakeholders such as government, activist 
groups, environmental advocates, NGO’s and communities attempt to influence a firm’s 
practices and policies through regulatory threats, campaigns, and social movements 
such as protests and consumer boycotts. There is considerable research that examines 
the mechanisms of these social movements and their impact on organizational change 
and outcomes (e.g., Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; 
Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; King, 2008; King & Soule, 2007; Lounsbury, 2001; Reid & 
Toffel, 2009). 
Increasingly, researchers have turned their attention towards the primary 
stakeholders of the firm such as employees, suppliers, buyers and provi ers of capital 
who also demand that firms favor their social and environmental interests over pure 
wealth maximization objectives desired by other shareholders of the firm (Monks, 
Miller, & Cook, 2004). Because primary stakeholders have direct connetio s with the 
firm, they possess legitimate channels such as letter writing, d rect communication with 
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top management or directors and posing questions at general meetings. These 
opportunities allow stakeholders to voice their concerns (Hirschman, 1970)regarding 
strategic decisions which impact the organization’s social responsibilities. More 
formally, those stakeholders of public corporations in the United States who also own 
shares in the firm, can file proposals on social and environmental issues concerning 
their firm. Since the 1970’s, stakeholders of public corporations in the United States 
have used these proposals to urge firms to adopt and implement policies that improve 
corporations’ social (including environmental) performance (CSP)1. 
Although a significant majority of large public corporations in the United States 
are already “stakeholder oriented” (Agle, Donaldson, Freeman, Jensen, Mitchell, & 
Wood, 2008), the new millennium has seen a sharp increase in the social and 
environmental nature of demands made to businesses through stakeholder proposals. 
Indeed, almost half of all stakeholder proposals filed at US public corporations during 
the first few years of this decade were concerned with social and environmental issues 
(Monks et al., 2004). This trend is likely to continue; impending institutional changes 
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which regulates 
stakeholder proposal activity in the United States, are a harbinger of vigorous 
stakeholder proposal seasons in the future (Sweeney, 2010). Because stakeholder 
proposal activity is on the rise, organizational researchers are also increasingly 
interested in stakeholder actions, plus organizational responses to stakeholder proposal 
                                                
1 For the purpose of this dissertation CSP will refer to a corporation’s performance on both social and 
environmental fronts. Managing relations with customers, suppliers, buyers and the community at large, 
ensuring fair pay, improved work environment, non-discrimination at job etc. are described as social 
issues. Avoiding business in “sin” industries and countries, reducing emissions, preparing sustainability 
reports, gearing up for climate change and ensuring corporation’s actions do not inflict harm on the 
general external environment etc are considered environmental issues. 
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activism (Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz, 2008; Sjöström, 2008). For example, what are the 
outcomes of stakeholder demands? Is the pressure exerted by stakeholders successful in 
inducing change in the way businesses operate? What changes in organizational 
structure does stakeholder pressure induce to succeed in influencing corporate policies 
and strategy? What are the implications of stakeholder pressure for the target 
corporation’s social and financial performance? Thus far, prior resea ch on the results 
of stakeholder activism reveals mixed views, provides conflicting results and offers 
unclear answers to most of the questions raised above. 
On one hand, researchers suggest that businesses do factor stakeholder pressures 
in their decision making (Berry & Rondinelli, 1998). By being responsive to social and 
environmental concerns, firms garner the support of stakeholders, reduce input costs, 
acquire legitimacy, and avoid negative publicity and/or adverse regulation (Bansal & 
Roth, 2000; Chiu & Sharfman, 2009; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). On the other hand, 
some researchers conclude that in general, because most proposals are unsuccessful, 
activism simply “lack[s] the power to create significant corporate change” (Haigh & 
Hazelton, 2004: 59). Increasingly, it is argued that stakeholder activism may not be an 
effective tool for influencing firm strategy or outcomes (Sjostrom, 2008). Millions of 
people invest in public firms, and in present times, are also increasingly anxious about 
the prospects of their investment bringing about greater social good. Because links 
between stakeholder activism and corporate social performance remain mixed, it would 
be useful to investigate the impact of stakeholder-oriented proposals on  firm’s social 
and environmental “bottom line”. 
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In this dissertation, I explain the conflicting conclusions of prior research by 
introducing the role of corporate managers in shaping the firm’s response to shareholder 
proposals. Corporate managers control most of the corporate resources which are 
necessary to achieve the objectives targeted by stakeholder initiatives (Frooman, 1999). 
Because managers hold a central position in the organization, they usually decide the 
setting of CSP strategy and the disbursement of funds for CSP investment . Seminal 
research on top manager strategic decision-making suggests that man gers exercise 
flexibility in decision-making (Sharfman & Dean, 1997), and tremendous iscretion or 
“latitude of managerial action” (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987: 371) over strategy 
formulation and resource allocation activities. Although in public corporations, 
directors hold the fiduciary responsibility of representing stakehold r interests, top 
managers have huge informational advantages over directors. CEO’s are intricately 
involved and exercise considerable control over the selection of directors (Monks & 
Minow, 1995) and subsequent committee decisions sometimes involving even their own 
compensation (Johnson, Porter, & Shackell-Dowell, 1997). Managers also have their 
own goals, e.g., minimizing their employment risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981), or 
maximizing their power, prestige, and salary (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). 
Therefore, to study the effect of stakeholder activism on CSP requires the inclusion of 
the “role of managers as a party with specific interests”(Tirole, 2001: 25); interests 
which may often collide with those of both firm owners and other stakehold rs (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976).  
In this study, I propose that changes in the firm’s response to stakeholder 
pressure are shaped by managerial influences. I also explain that it is possible for 
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stakeholder pressure directed at the improvement of a firm’s CSP to often end up only 
strengthening the stakeholder governance control mechanisms - “the design of 
institutions that induce or force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders” 
(Tirole, 2001: 4) within the firm. Managerial discretion contexts shapes the creation or 
effectiveness of stakeholder governance mechanisms resulting from stakeholder 
pressure. The strength of stakeholder governance mechanisms in turn may impact the 
subsequent level of CSP by the firm. To test this theory, I model the role of managerial 
discretion contexts as a moderator between the stakeholder pressure and stakeholder 
governance relationship. Figure 1 shows the models that were tested in this section of 
the dissertation. 
Next, I focus on the practical implications of the discretionary nature of CSP 
spending by studying the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and 
corporate financial performance (CFP). Nearly two decades of research on this topic has 
revealed mixed findings (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003) and the debate is still wide 
open. Studies relying on stakeholder theory argue that satisfied stakeholders are key to 
improving the organization’s overall effectiveness which, in turn, leads to improved 
financial performance (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Motivated employees, committed 
suppliers, and loyal buyers are more cooperative towards firms which project a socially 
superior image. Accordingly, such stakeholders increase their value-enhancing 
contributions to the firm enabling a simultaneous increase in CSP and CFP (Dutton, 
Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Greening & Turban, 2000). On the other hand, research 
from the agency and rent appropriation perspectives suggests that powerful stakeholders 
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firms, thereby leading to reduced levels of observed financial performance (Coff, 1999; 
Surroca & Tribó, 2008). Investigations launching on both these views have overlooked 
at least one theoretical and one empirical consideration. The first issue concerns the role 
of managers in controlling benefits arising out of CSP. The second issue stems from the 
discretionary nature of CSP spending and the omission of relevant antecedents to CSP 
from estimation of models investigating the CSP-CFP link. 
First, the central role of managers in controlling CSP investmn s provides a 
compelling argument for including managerial discretion contexts in a model 
investigating the CSP-CFP relationship. I address this issue by t sting a model of the 
CSP-CFP link with managerial discretion contexts as a moderator. Second, firms may 
choose to invest in CSP based on a variety of relevant antecedents (Chiu & Sharfman, 
2009). Some of these antecedents may in turn influence corporate financial 
performance. Omission of relevant CSP antecedent variables from an investigation of 
the CSP-CFP relationship introduces a specification error in our mdels inducing a 
sample-selection bias in our estimates (Heckman, 1979). Proceeding to estimate such 
models without applying proper statistical corrections would lead to an endogeneity 
problem and results in incorrect inferences drawn from inconsistet estimates (Greene, 
2008). I therefore explicitly include the decision to invest in CSP by using the Heckman 
selection model (Heckman, 1979). Specifically, in the first stage, I t st whether the 
decision to invest in CSP is indeed endogenous. If statistical tests confirm my 
hypothesis, I model the CSP-CFP relationship after controlling for the factors impacting 
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Importance of This Research 
The first contribution of this study is a clarification of the role played by 
managers in devising and implementing CSP initiatives proposed by stakeholders. Most 
previous research implicitly assumes away this role or fails to explicitly model it in 
empirical investigations. In this study, I include managerial discretion contexts as a 
moderator of the stakeholder pressure and CSP relationship. In effect, I attempt to 
answer the question of not only whether managers matter, but illustrate how exactly do 
they matter. Activist stakeholders are desirous of engendering change within the 
organization; this study informs stakeholders of the consequences of their efforts and 
why they may or may not see the results of their activism.  
The second contribution of this study is to show that although stakeholder 
proposals are targeted at improving the firm’s ultimate CSP, change takes the path 
through the design and enhancement of stakeholder governance mechanisms;  process 
which is influenced by managerial discretion. Specifically then, this study confirms the 
direct effects of stakeholder pressure on the stakeholder governanc mechanisms and 
the moderating role of managerial discretion. Research often focuses on corporate 
governance mechanisms as indicators of how well the firm governs issues related to 
stakeholders. This study clarifies why these two may not be synonymous, and why 
stakeholder governance should be treated as a distinct construct in studies of 
stakeholder activism and CSP. In testing the activism and stakeholder governance 
relationships, this study includes measurable indicators of stakeholder gov rnance 




The third contribution of this research is to provide further empirical clarity to 
the ambiguity surrounding the CSP-CFP relationship. If the decision to invest in CSP is 
determined to be endogenous, this study will provide evidence that prior empirical 
investigations using similar data may suffer from a specification error. This may help 
explain the non-significant relationship observed in many studies and offer c mpelling 
reasons for future researchers investigating the CSP-CFP link to explicitly model the 
endogeneity of the CSP decision in addition to the endogeneity due to omitted variables. 
A resolution to this debate also has theoretical and practical imp ications. For 
management researchers, evidence of a positive relationship between CSP and CFP will 
provide empirical support to arguments made in favor of instrumental and agency 
stakeholder perspectives (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & Evan, 1990). A 
negative relationship between these two constructs will provide more credence to 
agency theory perspectives (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2001). Finally, if a relationship 
does not exist, the rent appropriation perspective would seem to provide the best 
theoretical lens to further examine the CSP and CFP relationship. For management 
professionals, shareholders and stakeholders, evidence of the exact implicat ons of CSP 
spending on CFP will help untangle the gridlock in which these groups often find 
themselves battling over resource allocation decisions.  
The fourth and final contribution of this research is the specific 
acknowledgement of the role of managers in impacting the value that accrues to 
stakeholders. Again, the intent of this study is to show that even if sometimes the CSP-
CFP relationship is inconclusive, it is not because there is no underlyi g association 




actions and can appropriate the excess value generated by satisfied stakeholders, 
thereby reducing the levels of observed CFP. 
Overall then, this study highlights the central role of managers in devising and 
implementing corporate strategies such as CSP. Contexts in which managers possess 
greater latitude in decision making are shown to impact not only the formation and 
strength of stakeholder governance mechanisms, but the resulting corporate s cial 
performance and the ensuing benefits accrual into corporate financial performance.  
Organization of This Dissertation 
 This dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter Two (Literature Review and 
Hypotheses), I present a review of relevant stakeholder pressure, takeholder 
management, managerial discretion and corporate social performance literatures. After 
presenting the literature reviews, I develop two sets of hypotheses. The first set of 
hypotheses link stakeholder pressure with stakeholder governance. I present hypotheses 
for the moderating role of managerial discretion on the relationship between stakeholder 
pressure and stakeholder governance and on the relationship between stakeholder 
pressure and corporate social performance. In the second set of hypotheses, I propose 
that the relationship between CSP and CFP is moderated by manageri l discretion 
contexts, and that the decision to invest in CSP is endogenous. In Chapter Thre  
(Methods), I describe the data, sample, and variable construction and the general 
analysis techniques I employed. In Chapter Four (Results) I explain the research 
methodology applied to test each hypothesis and present the results of the analysis. 
Finally, in Chapter Five (Discussion), I provide a discussion of the findings, some 





LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, I present a review of the literature on stakehold r activism and 
its outcomes. In the first section of this chapter, I specifically address the most formal 
type of stakeholder activism: stakeholder pressure on the organization through proposal 
writing. I introduce the concept of stakeholder governance mechanisms – institutions 
designed to align managers’ interests with those of stakeholders, as a distinct concept 
from corporate governance which describes control mechanisms designed to oversee 
managers for the purpose of safeguarding shareholder wealth. I develop hypotheses to 
link stakeholder proposal activism with the strength of stakeholder governance 
mechanisms. I then introduce the moderating/mediating role of managerial discretion in 
shaping the stakeholder governance mechanisms. I complete the firs section of this 
chapter with development of hypotheses linking stakeholder pressure, stakeholder 
governance mechanisms and corporate social performance using hypotheses that model 
the moderating role of stakeholder governance mechanisms and manageri l discretion. 
Figure 1 displays the layout of the proposed theoretical model. 
In the second section of this chapter, I revisit the debate on the natur of the link 
between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance 
(CFP). I explain that previous research may have overlooked the possibility of CSP 
investment decisions being endogenous. I offer methodological suggestions on how to 
obtain more consistent estimates of the impact of CSP on CFP. I argue that managerial 




out of a firm’s CSP. Figure 2 displays the layout of the proposed theoretical model for 
this section of the chapter.   
Stakeholder Activism – Why Now? 
Economic growth in the United States has led to improved standards of living, 
quick dissemination of information, increased awareness and high societal expectations 
of the responsibilities of corporations towards the larger environment within which they 
operate (Reilly, 1990). Public corporations are under increasing amounts f pressure 
from society at large to re-direct their resources towards the value-maximization of 
other constituents besides their shareholders (Donaldson, 1982). Despite the r cent 
downturn in the economy, public perception of the role of business remains squarely 
focused on the social and environmental responsibilities of the firm. Indeed, in a recent 
survey, “three-fourths (74%) of Americans say, now more than ever, businesses must 
show leadership, courage and commitment in keeping corporate citizenship among the 
top business priorities” (GolinHarris, 2009: 2). Organizations are accountable to their 
stakeholders more today than ever and cannot just turn away from societal demands by 
treating them as a cost of doing business (Wood, 1991). Indeed the long term viability 
of corporations depends on addressing the needs of all stakeholders, which makes social 
and environmental issues an essential component of the modern corporation’s new 
“bottom line” (Heath & Palenchar, 2009). 
In order to ensure that corporations remain cognizant of their social and 
environmental responsibilities, and stay committed to resolving social and 
environmental issues, secondary stakeholders such as activist groups, environmental 




through regulatory threats and social movements such as protests and consumer 
boycotts. Past research has closely examined the mechanisms of ocial movements and 
their impact on corporate decision-making (Davis et al., 2005). For example, research 
suggests that it is possible for social movements to influence organizational policies 
towards their employees (Scully & Segal, 2002). Secondary stakeholder groups, such as 
communities, can influence organizations to become more cognizant of their 
environmental footprint, adopt recycling programs and reduce pollution (Eesley & 
Lenox, 2006; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Lounsbury, 2001; Reid & Toffel, 2009). Social 
movements such as protests and consumer boycotts, attempt to influence corporate 
policies by threatening to draw negative attention towards the organization’s lack of 
corporate social performance. Negative publicity for the firm is a hurdle to recruiting 
top talent or to attract investments from socially concerned investors (Turban & 
Greening, 1997). Research confirms that consumer boycotts and protests can indeed 
negatively impact corporate financial performance indicators such as stock prices 
(King, 2008; King & Soule, 2007; Pruitt, Wei, & White, 1988). 
However, not all external pressures are successful in influencing organizations 
and in achieving activists’ goals (Johnston, 1994). Members of stakeholder groups often 
vary in their awareness, ability and initiative in championing social causes (Rowley & 
Berman, 2000). Activist groups may have divergent or even competing interests which 
complicates the attainment of broad agreement on the priority of issues to be raised, and 
the exact mode of pressure to apply on target organizations to achieve desired 
objectives (Mark, Irene Hanson, & Kimberly, 2004; Wolfe & Putler, 2002). There is a 




assessment that the organization will be receptive to activism, which further impedes 
collaboration among stakeholder groups (Butterfield, Reed, & Lemak, 2004). Because 
secondary stakeholder do not control valuable resources required by the organization to 
operate, succeed or survive, they may lack the visibility, legitimacy and salience in the 
minds of managers and hence may lack the power to bring about change within the 
organization through activism (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Frooman, 1999; 
Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). For all these reasons, scholars are incrasingly turning 
towards alternate mechanisms that stakeholder groups employ to make their demands 
more salient to the organization; stakeholder activism through proposal writing is one 
such mechanism. 
Stakeholder Proposals 
Stakeholders desirous of voicing their concerns regarding an organizatio ’s CSP 
can engage in social activism through a variety of ways. They can directly communicate 
with top management or directors, ask questions at general meetings, write letters, or, if 
they own shares in the company, formally file stakeholder proposals. A stakeholder 
proposal2 is a written (not exceeding 500 words) recommendation, requirement or 
demand that the company (board of directors and/or top management) take certain
actions. For example: 
“A proposal can ask a company to adopt a human rights policy, to issue 
a report on how it plans to mitigate risks pertaining to greenhouse gas 
emissions or to implement ethical codes of conducts for its supply chain” 
(Sjöström, 2008) 
                                                
2 For the purpose of this dissertation, the term “stakeholder proposals” will refer to those proposals which 
raise social and environmental issues. These proposals are filed by equity holders with the express aim of 
pressuring the firm to maximize its CSP. By contrast, the term “shareholder proposals” will be used for 
proposal activity that targets corporate governance issues within the firm with the ultimate aim of 




Stakeholder proposals can be filed by individuals and groups who hold at least $2000 or 
1% of  shares of a public corporation continuously for one year; owners of share have to 
demonstrate their eligibility for filing the proposals (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2008; 
O'Rourke, 2003). Once a properly filed proposal is received, firms may decide to accept 
or reject it based on its relevance to the firms’ mission and objective, and the feasibility 
of acting upon the suggestions. If accepted, the issue raised in the proposal has to be 
included in the proxy reports of the firm and is voted upon by all sharehold rs in the 
company’s next general meeting. A proposal which receives a majority vote from all 
shareholders is still non-binding, and may be implemented subject to theapproval of 
management and the board of directors. 
Stakeholder activism through proposal writing has at least four benefits over 
stakeholder activism through social movements. First, anyone who owns the requisite 
number of shares in the organization can submit a stakeholder proposal, which holds the 
same legal importance as proposals submitted by large stakeholders. This empowers 
stakeholders to attempt to bring social change through individual action wi hout having 
to create a consensus among a broader group for collective action. Second, activism 
through proposal writing is a legal channel of communication (Mathiasen, 2004). 
Managers have a fiduciary responsibility to attend to the demands of those stakeholders 
who own equity in the firm (Eisenberg, 1976). Written proposals require a response by 
managers which forces them to acknowledge the issues being raised and to submit their 
responses on record. The proposal mechanism thus allows stakeholders to extract 
formal written responses from managers to issues managers may not otherwise address 




stakeholders than those of stakeholders who do not command  importance in their view 
(Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). Through proposals, activists can communicate 
and garner the support of other shareholders which increases the bargaining power of 
the stakeholders behind the initially submitted proposal and enhances the salience of the 
issue under consideration. Proposals are an efficient method of achieving this objective 
because regulation requires corporations to bear all costs of disseminating proposals 
through proxy statements using the corporation’s communication channels. Finally, 
research suggests that stakeholder activism through proposal writing is also a preferred 
vehicle for social movement stakeholders. Activists, NGO’s, unions, and special interest 
groups often purchase shares in organizations they are targeting for protests in order to 
alert managers to their demands and to make their demands more salient and legitimate 
in the eyes of top management and other stakeholders (Anderson, Ramsay, Marshall, & 
Mitchell, 2007; Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; Hoffman, 1996). 
Outcomes of stakeholder proposals. Prior literature provides a mixed picture of 
the success of stakeholder proposals in bringing about changes in corporati ns’ social 
performance. On one hand, some researchers have expressed optimism over the 
influence of stakeholder activism on corporate policy. Research suggests that firms 
garner the support of stakeholders, acquire legitimacy, reduce input costs, and avoid 
negative publicity and/or adverse regulation when they demonstrate responsiveness to 
social and environmental concerns (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Chiu & Sharfman, 2009; 
Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). The expectation of such benefits compels businesse  to 
factor stakeholder pressures in their decision making (Berry & Rondinelli, 1998). 




issues, the salience of CSP issues for firms has also increased (Sparkes & Cowton, 
2004). This has led some scholars to opine that the more stakeholders press 
organizations for CSP, the more likely it is that organizations will increase their CSP 
(Campbell, 2007). 
On the other hand, some researchers argue that because suggestions included in 
stakeholder proposals are non-binding and subject to process-constraints, passage of 
proposals remains difficult, if not impossible (Engel, 2006). Indeed, when put to a vote, 
the majority of stakeholder proposals fail to get even 10% support frm other 
shareholders (Logsdon & Van Buren, 2008). Other researchers suggest that it matters 
little whether a proposal gets accepted, rejected or settled outsi e of the voting process; 
“no real changes to core policies are made” in response to stakeholder activism (David, 
Bloom, & Hillman, 2007: 98). These dismal results have led some researchers to 
conclude that most proposals go unsuccessful and can hence be declared a failure. In 
short, shareholder activism ‘lack[s] the power to create significa t orporate change’ 
(Haigh & Hazelton, 2004: 59). There is therefore a growing doubt among sme 
researchers concerning stakeholder activism as an effective tool for influencing 
corporations’ strategies towards improving their social and environmental performance 
(Lawrence & Morrell, 1995; Sjöström, 2008).  
In general, past research on the affect of stakeholder pressures on firms to 
increase their corporate social performance has adopted a social-mvement theoretical 
lens and largely predicted outcomes based on institutional perspectives. However, the 
mixed findings in the literature reveal that existing theoretical approaches may be 




stakeholders have been insisting on the wrong set of outcomes (Kerr, 1995) or 
researchers have ignored other possible outcomes besides an improvement in CSP also  
remains an open question. Research on the outcome of shareholder activism – proposals 
filed by equity holders to improve the corporation’s financial performance, holds the 
potential to inform these questions. As previously stated, in this dissertation, I draw a 
distinction between stakeholder and shareholder activism; thus far, both have largely 
been treated as homogenous types of investor activism. 
Some intriguing parallels can be drawn between research on stakeholder 
activism – equity holders’ pressure on firms to focus on social and environmental 
issues, and shareholder activism – suggestions by shareholders directing management 
and directors towards safeguarding shareholder wealth. Both kinds of activism emanate 
from an inherent difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of managerial strategy in 
implementing the desires of the owners of the firm. Below, I describe briefly the 
similarities and differences between these two types of activism, provide a brief 
overview of the literature on stakeholder pressures and explain how adopting the more 
agency-theoretic predictions from the shareholder literature can help us predict possible 
outcomes of stakeholder pressure on firms.  
Shareholder Activism – Purpose and Outcomes 
In contrast to the stakeholder activism literature, shareholder activism literature 
has largely viewed activism antecedents and outcomes through an agency theory lens. 
In public corporations, shareholding owners (or principals) are separatd from 
organizational control and decision-making activities (Berle & Means, 1932). 




superiorities over shareholders and are therefore entrusted to make str tegic decisions 
for the firm. A central tenet of agency theory is that manageri l agents and shareholding 
principals have divergent predilections towards the allocation of firm resources (Ross, 
1973). Agency theorists argue that not all managerial decisions maximize shareholder 
wealth; because managerial pay and prestige is tied to firm growth, self-interest 
compels them to minimize their employment risk and maximize th ir own 
compensation by often engaging in projects that destroy shareholder value (Amihud & 
Lev, 1981; Baumol, 1967; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Marris, 1964). Shareholders therefore appoint a board of directors 
delegated with a fiduciary responsibility to represent shareholder interests within the 
organization, and to oversee and advise managers in setting corporate strategy 
(Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991). All publicly held corporations in the United States, 
regardless of size, are required by the various corporate laws of their state of 
incorporation to have a board of directors. Thus the board of directors, with its power to 
hire, compensate and fire managers, has assumed the central role in the corporate 
governance of US firms (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Jensen, 1993).  
The ultimate goal of shareholders is the protection and maximizat on of their 
wealth, but it is difficult, or too costly, for non-specialist shareholders to ascertain the 
real consequences of professional managers’ strategic decisions for shareholder wealth 
protection and maximization. In search of an optimum solution to “control” managers, 
shareholders entrust the board of directors to both incentivize and monitor managers. 
Directors in turn employ means ranging from salaries, commission , and stock options 




performance targets (Eisenhardt, 1985, 1989). To this end, various corporate 
governance mechanisms that address the structure of managerial compensation, board-
compensation independence and diversity, and safeguards against managerial 
entrenchment have been enacted and perfected within the firm (see Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997 for a review). These mechanisms are specifically designed to protect shareholders 
by ensuring that managerial actions and board oversight are harmonious with 
shareholder desires of protecting and growing their investments in the firm.  
If shareholders suspect that despite the existence of these corporate g vernance 
controls, the actions of board members or management threaten sharholde  goals, they 
engage in activism through proposal writing to inform directors (and top management) 
of their concerns. A review of the shareholder activism literature indicates that while 
activism may not always result in the long term improvement in operational and 
financial efficiency of the firm, it may be successful in achieving governance changes 
within companies (Gillan & Starks, 2007). This has led to the conclusion that rather 
than achieve directly the primary objective of protecting and maxiizing shareholder 
wealth, activism can help strengthen corporate governance mechanisms within the firm. 
Corporate governance mechanisms in turn help shareholders monitor and incetivize 
managers to keep shareholder goals paramount in managerial decision making (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994). For example, shareholder proposals can “call for firms to rescind 
poison pills,  reject paying “greenmail”, require confidential voting, or make other 
changes in the rules that govern relations between shareholders, dir ctors, and top-level 
managers” (Karpoff, Malatesta, & Walkling, 1996: 366). Shareholder activism is hence 




strengthen the corporate governance mechanisms within the firm for the ultimate goal 
of safeguarding shareholder wealth. 
Below, I describe how theoretical approaches employed in shareholder activism 
research can be applied to stakeholder activism to better understand its outcomes. 
Stakeholder activism research has so far focused on the ultimate i provement in CSP 
as the primary result of stakeholder pressure. Perhaps other internal cha ges within the 
firm are a more plausible outcome of stakeholder activism. 
Stakeholder Activism - Purpose and Outcomes 
Stakeholders desirous of bringing social changes through firm actions are 
relatively more dispersed than those shareholders interested in safeguarding their 
wealth. While shareholder activism is dominated by large blocks of shareholders such 
as pension funds, mutual investment groups, and insurance funds, stakeholder activism
is usually spearheaded by individuals, religious organizations such as te Interfaith 
Council on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), NGOs, or other groups acting on behalf of 
a group of stakeholders with common interests (Campbell, Gillan, & Niden, 1999; 
Monks et al., 2004). It is much harder for individual stakeholders to measur  
quantitatively the true impact of a firm’s efforts to maximize the welfare of its 
constituents such as employees, suppliers, or buyers than to assess it  financial 
performance (Coff, 1999; Tirole, 2001). Whereas, volatility in the income stream or 
market value of firms instantly draws attention from analysts, only egregious departures 
from stakeholder social and environmental agendas are punished by litigation (Kassinis 
& Vafeas, 2002). This allows managers to pursue stakeholder value-destroying 




From an agency theory perspective, the information asymmetry between 
management and stakeholders is even more egregious than that between shareholders 
and managers. Recall that shareholder activism attempts to minimize this information 
asymmetry by designing and strengthening several corporate governanc  mechanisms 
within the firm which serve to monitor and incentivize managers. Similarly, I propose 
that in order to investigate the impact of stakeholder activism, it is reasonable to turn 
our attention towards those corporate governance mechanisms within the firm which 
facilitate the monitoring and incentivizing of managers to minimize the information 
asymmetry and to maximize the corporate social and environmental performance of the 
firm. Next, I describe why internal control mechanisms directed exclusively at 
improving the social performance of firms are required to supplement th  prevailing 
corporate governance mechanisms, which are designed specifically for the purpose of 
safeguarding shareholder wealth in the firm. 
Stakeholder Pressure and Stakeholder Governance  
Since social and environmental issues have gained increasing importance, 
visibility, and legitimacy in the minds of stakeholders, pressure is mounting on firms to 
be better corporate citizens (Chiu & Sharfman, 2009; Sharfman, 1994). In response, 
organizations are scrambling to alter their corporate governance mechanisms to also 
address social issues. However, a conflict remains in the objective function between 
these two modes of governance (Jensen, 2001). While both normative and instrume tal 
stakeholder theorists contend that shareholder wealth maximization and stakeholder 
welfare are mutually achievable goals, and by extension, corporate gov rnance 




& Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004), agency theorists 
of a more rational leaning argue otherwise (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2001; Sundaram & 
Inkpen, 2004). Ambiguity in understanding the causal mechanisms through whic CSP 
is linked with financial performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003), and evidence that managers 
often “hide” behind such spending to earn personal benefits, often banishes CSP to the 
realm of an agency problem for the firm (Jensen, 2001). Thus, from a stakeholder 
perspective, traditional corporate governance mechanisms are paradoxically ineffective 
in controlling supposedly wasteful spending by encouraging the same. 
The ambiguity over the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms n 
enhancing firms’ CSP also adds to the complexity in understanding the ou comes of 
stakeholder’s activism. Corporate governance mechanism have evolved to further only 
one agenda; the protection and maximization of shareholder wealth (Sh eifer & Vishny, 
1997). Most corporate governance measures, by design, do not help stakeholder 
activists’ broad social and environmental causes. For example, research indicates that 
strong corporate governance, such as ownership and general board structure, plus 
safeguards against managerial entrenchment, work to reverse investments in CSP and 
steer them towards the corporate goal of shareholder wealth protection (Barnea & 
Rubin, 2010; Brammer & Millington, 2005; Surroca & Tribó, 2008). Other evidence 
suggests that even when corporate governance mechanisms are successful in inducing 
better social outcomes, they may only be effective in eliciting f rm responses along 
narrow strategic dimensions which may only help a select few stakeholders (Johnson & 
Greening, 1999; Kacperczyk, 2009). It follows then that corporations’ conception of 




that induce or force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders” (Tirole, 
2001: 4), should be treated separately from studies of the effect of existing corporate 
governance mechanisms on firms’ CSP. Next, I briefly describe the limited existing 
work on the topic of governance mechanisms designed exclusively to improve the 
corporate social performance of firms. 
Stakeholder governance mechanisms. Research on stakeholder activism 
targeting organizations’ corporate social performance is still growing (Sjöström, 2008). 
A literature review indicates that most studies that have addressed the emergence of 
those corporate governance measures which explicitly safeguard the social interests of 
stakeholders, use a case analysis methodology (e.g., De Wit, Wade, & Schouten, 2006; 
Lovdal, Bauer, & Treverton, 1977; Mackenzie, 2007; Ricart, Rodríguez, & Sánchez, 
2005; Spitzeck, 2009)3. 
Earlier in this dissertation, I pointed out that the shareholder activism literature 
indicates that not all proposals are accepted; some proposals are withdrawn because 
stakeholders manage to acquire some support from the firm for making the requested 
changes. Because institutional and social pressures are usually ccessful in creating 
structural changes within the organization (Greening & Gray, 1994), often the changes 
agreed upon by managers occur in those mechanisms within the firm which are 
designed to ensure that a particular social objective is met in the fu ure. Prior research 
shows that stakeholder proposals usually ask for general changes in codes within 
organizations rather than focus on specific desired outcomes (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). 
Stakeholder activists themselves do not anticipate the entire proposal to be accepted and 
                                                





implemented; they are prepared to accept a thoughtful response and indication that the 
firm will continue to pursue the issues raised (IRRC, 1993: 1). There is also evidence 
that even if proposals are successful, rather than creating long term change, they force 
the organization to make minor internal adjustments (O'Rourke, 2003). Specifically, the 
argument is that the greater the pressure of stakeholders on therganization, the more 
the organization will strengthen its internal control systems. It follows then that rather 
than directly achieve the objective of increased CSP, stakeholder pressure may be 
successful in achieving changes in internal control mechanisms that govern managerial 
interests and behaviors such that they become more aligned with stakeholders than 
shareholders.  
H1: Stakeholder pressure is positively associated with the subsequent 
overall strength of stakeholder governance mechanisms within the firm. 
Somewhat similar to corporate governance mechanisms, stakeholder governance 
can also encompass several mechanisms of incentives and allocation of c trol rights 
which may each help re-align managerial interests with those of stakeholders 
demanding social changes. Absent any large legal restrictions on managers to pursue 
social and environmental initiatives, and an unclear impact of CSP spending on firm 
financial performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003); it is reasonable to consider that 
stakeholders might prefer control mechanisms to align managers with stakeholder 
demands. Drawing on research on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on 
CSP, I present two such control mechanisms that might improve the monitoring of 
social issues within the firm and hence hold the potential to become an outcome of 




Corporate social responsibility (CSR) board committees. From an agency 
theoretic perspective, dispersed stakeholder principals are in no position to assess 
correctly the impact of managerial agents on the social and environmental performance 
goals of the firm. The board of directors thus becomes a de-facto tool for stakeholders 
to evaluate and compensate managers for their role in furthering stakeholder objectives. 
However, “[t]he work of the board is done in committees” (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989: 
59). Board committees allow the delegation of board responsibilities to smaller groups 
of board members facilitating the separation of tasks and functions. F r example, the 
compensation committee is ubiquitous in modern public corporation boards. Together 
with the audit committee, the compensation committee performs the role of evaluating 
CEO performance and designing appropriate incentives to ensure CEO’s do not stray 
from the shareholder wealth protection objectives of the firm (Conyon & Simon, 1998; 
Laux & Laux, 2009). Special board committees have been a favorite tool of shareholder 
activists to ensure specialist board members can oversee professional managers, and for 
organizations to signal their legitimacy to regulatory bodies such as the SEC (Harrison, 
1987). 
Evidence from UK suggests that the use of corporate responsibility oard 
committees to incorporate corporate responsibility issues is on the rise (Spitzeck, 2009). 
An examination of board composition of US corporations also indicates the emergence 
and prevalence of committees  for the purpose of augmenting existing committee board 
structures (Evan & Freeman, 1993). CSR board committees are entrustd with insuring 
that the corporation complies with its social responsibility policies and standards and 




objectives (Cochran & Wartick, 1988). Mackenzie (2007) explains that CSR board 
committees are responsible for reviewing CSR issues, specially issues that may have a 
potentially negative impact on the company’s business and reputation plus which pose 
financial risks to the firm (Ricart et al., 2005). CSR committees also review company’s 
external reporting on issues of social concern (Lovdal et al., 1977). 
Stakeholder proposals are intended to highlight social issues and regular board 
committees are generally designed to provide traditional corporate governance 
oversight. Therefore, it is likely that stakeholders attribute the firm’s lack of attention to 
social and environmental performance to an absence of concern within the firm for 
social and environmental issues. Research shows that the mere existence of special 
board committees directed towards improving CSP can signal to concerned stak holders 
that the firm is indeed responsive to their demands (Greening & Gray, 1994). It follows 
then, that under pressure from stakeholder activists, the firm may find it beneficial to 
create committees that specifically address stakeholder issues. Stakeholder pressure 
may thus result in the creation of dedicated CSR committees. Or formally,  
H2: Stakeholder pressure is positively associated with the subsequent 
presence of CSR board committees in the firm. 
 
CSR board committee composition. The composition of the board of directors is 
instrumental in assessing the effectiveness of managerial stategy (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990). Likewise, the composition of the committee could also be seen a  a 
legitimate target for shareholder activism. Most committee mmbers are appointed by 
managers and are more likely not to objectively evaluate or critically scrutinize 




and share the same management philosophies as themselves because su h directors are 
more sympathetic to CEO’s (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Most committee members 
appointed by management are also beholden to the corporate wealth maximization 
objective of other large shareholders and may not necessarily pursue stakeholder issues 
as diligently; the votes cast by such committee members often reveal their allegiance to 
corporate management (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). Therefore, scholars have long argued 
for the importance and necessity of stakeholders to be represented o  the board of 
directors in public corporations (Jones & Goldberg, 1982). 
From an institutional perspective, representation of stakeholders on key board 
committees may provide a perception of legitimacy to organizations and enhance their 
normative approval by government and society (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). The legitimacy of board committees is strengthened if board members 
are truly recognized by society as experts on social issues or are known to be 
sympathetic to stakeholder causes. Committee members, who are more cognizant and 
sympathetic towards stakeholder causes, can use their experience and knowledge to 
provide better advice to managers on social and environmental issues. Such board 
members are also desirable to most large stakeholder groups which decry the p evalence 
of a homogenous group of shareholder-centric directors in most firms. Stakeholders 
demand board members who are different in their background, experience and 
perspective than other members of the board. For example, CALPERS is a large 
pension fund which is known for its activism on board diversity issues. Just recently, a 
top executive at CALPERS bemoaned: 





 CALPERS is demanding that committee members be elected from a list of 
directors compiled by the pension fund itself. To that end, CALPERS is compiling a list 
of stakeholder-sympathetic professionals such as union leaders, environmental activists, 
NGO members etc. to be nominated to the board of directors of targetfirms with poor 
corporate governance (Chon, 2010). Shareholder activism research indicates that such 
appointments are a mutually beneficial arrangement. Those board members who 
implement shareholder proposals have lower chances of losing their board seat and 
directorships than those who go against shareholder initiatives (Ertimur, Ferri, & 
Stubben, 2010). In sum, it is likely that stakeholder activism will also be successful in 
changing the composition of the CSR committee towards a more stak holder-friendly 
committee, or formally: 
H3: Stakeholder pressure is positively associated with the subsequent 
presence of stakeholder sympathetic members on board CSR committees. 
Thus far, I have relied on institutional theory and agency theory to predict that 
stakeholder activism results in changes in internal control mechanisms within the firm. 
Next, I address the question whether stakeholder pressure is always successful in 
creating change within the organization, or, there are factors within the organization that 
may mitigate this impact. In effect, I define and establish the boundary conditions of the 
theory presented above. In doing so, I explain that institutional and agency theory 
assumptions of principals being successful in alleviating information asymmetries by 
designing effective control mechanisms may not always hold true. Relying on upper-
echelons research (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), I relax institutional 
theory assumptions when I explore the possibility of managerial discretion contexts in 




more discretion in firm decisions, their impact on firm outcomes is stronger (Crossland 
& Hambrick, 2007; Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). 
Resulting control mechanisms within the firm may therefore be shaped or even thwarted 
by managerial intervention. 
Managerial Discretion 
Much of the research on stakeholder proposal activism is grounded in resourc  
dependence and institutional theories. Scholars espousing the resource dependence and 
institutional views have long argued that primary stakeholders possess resources which 
are required by firms to operate successfully, acquire legitimacy, succeed competitively, 
and perhaps even survive (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The 
reliance of the firm on key stakeholders creates an organizational resource dependence 
relationship between stakeholders and the firm (Pfeffer, 1978). Specially, according to 
the institutional perspective, organizations acquiesce to stakeholders demands in order 
to maintain legitimacy and align their practices and policies to conform to the social 
pressures placed on them (Deephouse, 1999; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
However, research from a strategic choice perspective indicates that managers 
use their discretion in combating various stakeholder pressures exerted on he firm, and 
in structuring the firm’s relationships with its stakeholders (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). In doing so, managers try to find ways to increase their own bargaining 
power, which denotes the potential for strategic choice (Child, 1997; Salancik & 
Pfeffer, 1978). Some resource dependence scholars concede that institutio al pressures 
may not be entirely deterministic; even under external pressure managers mak  trategic 




(Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Indeed, external institutional 
pressures create opportunities for managers to be “both strategic nd opportunistic” 
(Hoffman, 1999: 366) in exploiting the uncertainty caused by institutional change. 
Those managers, who are under pressure from stakeholders to pursue social 
issues, exhibit a similar range of strategic behavior. To date, research on stakeholder 
activism and CSP has largely focused on the direct relationship between the two 
constructs with a particular emphasis on the divergence of shareholder and stakeholder 
goals (see Sjöström, 2008 for a review). A practical reality of the modern public 
corporation is that it is managers, not shareholders or stakeholders, who set CSP 
strategy, determine social and environmental investment thresholds, an  control all 
other resources vital to the fulfillment of stakeholder demands (Frooman, 1999). 
Because professional managers have strategic informational advant ges over other 
members of the organization, especially stakeholders, they enjoy the most “aut nomy of 
choice” within the organization (Child, 1997: 53). Therefore, it is likely that managerial 
responses to stakeholder activism are determined by both the institutional pressure on 
the firm, and circumstance which determine the “latitude of managerial action” allowed 
to top managers over resource allocation decisions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987: 371; 
Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). 
Managerial discretion theory explains that there are several 
organizational and environmental contexts that might determine the extent to 
which CEO’s matter to organizations strategy and policy (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Management research has 




contexts to demonstrate the role they play in impacting managerial discretion’s 
relationship with various organizational phenomena. For example, research h s 
used these contexts to investigate the moderators of the relationship between 
CEO compensation and firm performance (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998), top 
management team tenure and organization outcomes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990), internal alignment under regulatory constraints (Peteraf & Reed, 2007) 
and managerial hubris and risk taking (Li & Tang, 2010). 
Likewise, in this dissertation, I propose that certain organizational a d 
environmental contexts affect managerial discretion. In organizational a d 
environmental contexts which allow greater latitude to managers in decision-
making, managers have a greater impact on firm outcomes (Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987). In such situations, the agency costs of managerial discretion 
are also high (Lang, Poulsen, & Stulz, 1995). For example, excess cash flow  
available to managers are a positive indicator of a high-discretion situation 
(Jensen, 1986). Similarly, research indicates that debt is an organizatio al level 
indicator of a low-discretion situation because debt reduces the agency costs of 
high managerial discretion (Stulz, 1990). Thus, I leverage managerial discretion 
theory as a conceptual bridge between the predominantly deterministic 
institutional and power dependence theories and the overwhelmingly managerial 
agency theory to explain the role of high-discretion situations in shaping the 
outcomes from stakeholder pressure. 
Stakeholder pressure, stakeholder governance, and the moderating role of 




the “management of discretion” (Ackerman, 1975: 32-33) within the sphere of 
managerial actions. In other words, managerial discretion extends o the realm of those 
managerial actions which are taken in pursuit of increasing a corporation’s social 
performance (Carroll, 1979). For example:  
Management can almost always rationalize any action by invoking its 
impact on the welfare of some stakeholder. An empire builder can justify
a costly acquisition by a claim that the purchase will save a couple of 
jobs in the acquired firm; a manager can choose his brother-in-law as 
supplier on the grounds that the latter's production process is 
environmentally friendly - (Tirole, 2001). 
 
Thus any study of the effects of stakeholder activism on CSP  requires 
the inclusion of the “role of managers as a party with specific interests” (Tirole, 
2001: 25). As discussed earlier, often these managerial interests can collide with 
the interests of the owners of the firm and other stakeholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In such circumstances, it is expected that stakeholder pressure 
will not remain the sole force that determines the design and strength of 
stakeholder governance mechanisms within the firm. Specifically, 
organizational and environmental contexts which present opportunities to 
managers to exercise discretion will influence the existence or strength of 
stakeholder governance mechanisms resulting from prior stakeholder pressure. 
Managerial discretion assumes supremacy at the very beginning of the 
stakeholder proposal submission process. Stakeholder proposals are required to b  
submitted to the company’s executive office which allows managers to prepare their 
responses before other organizational constituents can provide their input. Managerial 




regulatory environment) that allows managers tremendous leeway in responding to 
stakeholder criticism of their shortfalls in pursuing items of social significance.  
One of the many different reasons stakeholder proposals fail is because they can 
be declared “non-strategic” by management. The determination is based on managerial 
assessments that the proposal is not significantly related to the operations of the 
company because it concerns itself with less than 5% of the company’s total assets, net 
earnings and gross sales (Ingram, Coco, Cummins, & Gumbs, 2001). Managers are not 
only privy to the operations within the firm but also exercise control over the various 
accounting decisions that lead to the reporting of financial performance to stakeholders 
(Murphy, 1996). In high-discretion situations, managers gain even more control over 
these processes (Bowen, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam, 2008) and can arbitrarily over-
rule stakeholder demands. Even when voted upon and accepted by a majority of 
stakeholders, stakeholder proposals are non-binding. Because most managers re more 
committed to the status-quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993) it is not 
surprising that top management is often in defiance or even outright denial when 
stakeholders accuse them of some wrongdoing (Vandekerckhove et al., 2007) 
High-discretion situations also mean that CEO’s have the freedom to pick and 
choose some causes and then champion them inside the firm. For example, in response 
to pressure from stakeholders to improve the social performance of th firm, managers 
may create specialized departments within the firm and staff them with professional 
managers to signal their commitment to social issues without act ally improving the 
bottom line on social performance (Brammer & Millington, 2003; Saiia, Carroll, & 




their organization from stakeholder pressure; these tactics range from reputation 
management and impression management to pure rhetoric and imagery (Carter, 2006; 
Snider, Hill, & Martin, 2003; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). In such cases where managerial 
action is disconnected with any substantial structural changes within the firm which 
might serve to monitor managers, we will likely see no change i  stakeholder 
governance mechanisms stemming from stakeholder pressure on the firm. Recent 
research posits that stakeholder pressure on firms may in fact be  “catalyst for wider 
discretion” (Phillips, Berman, Elms, & Johnson-Cramer, 2010: 178) afforded to 
managers. 
Often managers enhance their discretion by pitting one political co ition 
(stakeholders) against another (owners). For example, managers can deny the payment 
of overtime pay by appealing to shareholder instructions of economizing on labor costs. 
Managers are also known to adopt an instrumental approach towards salient 
stakeholders. In response to stakeholder pressure, managers  settle with large 
stakeholders, however, even when they do acquiesce to powerful stakeholders, change 
is often more symbolic than substantial (David et al., 2007). It follows then that the 
creation of stakeholder governance mechanisms within the firm will also be influenced 
heavily by situations in which managers exercise discretion. Or,  
H4. Managerial discretion contexts weaken the positive relationship 
between stakeholder pressure and subsequent overall stakeholder 
governance 
Managerial discretion contexts and board CSR committees. Even though the 
board of directors holds the fiduciary responsibility of representing sakeholder interests 




over most directors. To the extent that CEO’s are intricately involved and exercise 
considerable control over the selection of directors (Monks & Minow, 1995) and 
subsequent committee decisions sometimes involving even the CEO’s own 
compensation (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Johnson et al., 1997). Managers are known to 
insert themselves into key committees in order to ensure no decisions tilt the balance of 
power against them. Although outside directors are often used to bring in some neutral 
perspectives, research indicates that managers are often succes f l in installing outside 
directors who are instrumental in further entrenching managers within the firm (Wade, 
O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990). Managers make every effort to appear to conform to 
demands of board independence, yet these efforts are purposely designed to b  
ineffective (Westphal & Graebner, 2010). 
I therefore argue further that it is likely that high discretion situations in which 
managers exercise tremendous influence over setting of corporate gvernance policy 
within the firm, will also offer managers a chance to influence change in stakeholder 
governance policies resulting from stakeholder pressure. Resulting sakeholder 
governance mechanisms will therefore be shaped more by managers’ decisions than 
external pressures. It is likely that stakeholder-oriented change i  the board 
composition, such as the strength of board CSR committees, is also impacted by the 
high discretion situations. The essence of these arguments is captured in the following 
hypothesis:  
H5: Managerial discretion contexts moderate the relationship between 
stakeholder pressure and the strength of board CSR committees such 





Stakeholder pressure and corporate social performance. In the previous 
sections, I have explained how stakeholder pressure is not always succes f l in 
achieving the desired objective of maximizing firms’ CSP. In astriking parallel 
to the outcome of shareholder activism, stakeholder activism possibly looses 
most of its steam impacting the stakeholder governance mechanisms within the 
firm. If this is true, and stakeholder pressure manages to transfo m the 
stakeholder governance measures within the firm, then any relationship between 
stakeholder pressure and CSP should at least weaken  when stakeholder 
governance is used as a control variable in the model. 
H6: Stakeholder governance mediates the relationship between 
stakeholder pressure and CSP such that any relationship between 
stakeholder pressure and subsequent CSP is weakened when stakeholder 
governance is introduced as a mediating variable in the model. 
Managerial discretion plays a somewhat similar role in possibly altering any 
improvements in CSP that may arise out of stakeholder pressure. Earlier I 
explained how certain organizational and environmental contexts might allow 
managers tremendous latitude of action. As a result, managers gain discretion in 
dealing with pressures exerted by stakeholders. Managers use their discretionary 
powers to weaken stakeholder governance mechanisms. In high discretion 
contexts, managers are more likely to weaken the CSP resulting from 
stakeholder pressure. The following hypothesis formally capture the essence of 
the arguments made in the preceding sections: 
H7: Managerial discretion contexts weaken the positive relationship 
between stakeholder pressure and CSP 




Having traced the links between stakeholder pressures, corporate governance 
mechanisms, managerial discretion and corporate social performance in th  previous 
section, I now turn towards the relationship between a corporation’s social performance 
(CSP) and its financial performance (CFP). The link between CSP and CFP has been a 
contentious topic in much of prior research; to date, scholars are divide  on the exact 
nature of the relationship and the debate is ongoing. A better understanding of the 
impact of CSP on CFP can help resolve apparent conflicts between stakeholder theory 
and corporate governance theories. For example, if research is able to confirm that 
increased CSP does indeed benefit the financial performance of firms, then stakeholders 
may find it easier to pressure organizations to direct more resou ces towards the 
maximization of the general welfare of stakeholders. A resolution of this debate may 
also help organization craft better and more balanced governance mechanisms which 
incentivize and monitor managers to enhance both the social and financial performance 
of the firm. Much criticism of stakeholder literature stems from the inability of research 
to clearly guide decision-makers on how to balance competing stakeholder demands; 
additional insight into the nature of the CSP-CFP relationship holds the potential to 
address this concern.   
Motivated by the significance of this debate, in this section of the dissertation, I 
will re-explore the relationship between CSP and CFP. I will argue that in order to 
understand the nature of the relationship, researchers must include the moderating role 
of managerial discretion. In addition, I will explain that empirical investigations of the 
CSP-CFP relationship could benefit from an additional methodological consideration. It 




one methodological concern respectively, research will be able to better understand the 
true underlying relationship between corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance.    
CSP and CFP – Theoretical and methodological considerations. Nearly three 
decades of research examining the link between CSP and CFP has reve led mixed 
findings and conflicting results (Brammer & Millington, 2008; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003). In this 
hotly contested debate, research launching on normative and instrumental stakeholder 
theories has argued that improvement in CSP can result in satisfied stakeholders who 
are key to improving the organization’s overall effectiveness (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995). Firms which project a socially superior image attract motivated employees, 
committed suppliers and socially conscious buyers and investors who feel more positive 
and are more cooperative towards such firms (Dutton et al., 1994; Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Greening & Turban, 2000; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Turban & Greening, 1997). 
Some scholars have also advanced the notion that balancing the needs of a iverse 
group of stakeholders constrains management from making self-serving in estments 
thereby economizing on agency costs (Freeman & Evan, 1990). Researchers conclude 
that improvements in CSP may increase the value-enhancing contributions from 
stakeholders and minimize agency costs which may collectively increase the 
corporation’s financial performance (Hill & Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995). 
On the other hand, some researchers have argued that the corporation’s primary 
goal is to protect and maximize the wealth of shareholders (Eaterbrook & Fischel, 




pursue two seemingly disparate objectives of shareholder wealth protection and 
stakeholder welfare maximization may divert valuable resources to ill-defined causes, 
detract managers from efficiently running the firm, and may eventually serve neither 
stakeholders nor shareholders (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Investing in CSP comes at 
some costs to the firm and resource diversion towards unclear social g als may have an 
adverse effect on a firm’s financial performance (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Challenging the notion that better stakeholder 
management reduces agency costs, agency scholars contend that by pitting stakeholders 
against each other, managers may in fact accrue private benefits i  the guise of 
increasing general stakeholder welfare (Jensen, 2001). 
Finally, research from a rent appropriation perspective has proposed another 
avenue through which a corporation’s engagement in CSP may be unable to induce a 
positive spillover effect on its financial performance. It is well known that the prior 
performance of firms enables them to invest in improvements in future CSP (Waddock 
& Graves, 1997). However, when successful firms cater to powerful stakeholders such 
as buyers, suppliers, employees and the community at large, thes  stakeholders may 
accrue significant unobserved benefits generated by the firm (Coff, 1999). Such rent 
appropriation may in turn result in subsequently reduced observed levels of a firm’s 
financial performance. A joint consideration of the above explanations reveals that it is 
likely that research examining the link between CSP and CFP may find either a modest 
positive or a non-significant relationship between the two constructs. 
Although the normative stakeholder, agency and rent appropriation theoretical 




either be positive, negative or inconclusive respectively, empirical results are far from 
confirmatory of any one theoretical perspective. Many research rs conclude that the 
heterogeneous results found in prior research are perhaps due to errors in measuring 
CSP and CFP, problems with the samples used, or omission of relevant variables from 
the models (Garcia-Castro, Ariño, & Canela, 2010; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). In this dissertation I draw on past re earch and propose a 
model in which two other important considerations are added; the role of managers in 
controlling benefits arising out of CSP and the discretionary nature of social and 
environmental spending. The aim of introducing a possible moderating/mediating 
variable and an additional methodological consideration is to explore further the exact 
nature of the link between CSP and CFP. I demonstrate that a lack of association 
between the two variables in prior research does not mean that a rel ionship does not 
exist; rather it is confounded by either role of managers exercising their discretion or a 
methodological problem in model specification. 
CSP and CFP – The role of managerial discretion. I creasingly, researchers 
are finding that the relationship between CSP and CFP is also possibly moderated by 
several exogenous variables (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Russo & Fouts, 1997). The 
discretionary nature of CSP spending and the central role of managers in controlling 
CSP investments provides a compelling argument for including managerial discretion in 
a model in which managerial discretion contexts possibly moderate the cyclical 
relationship between CSP and CFP. 
Research has long argued that even if managers pursue socially responsible 




often, managers use social issue investments to further their own career goals at the 
expense of the firm and other stakeholders (Friedman, 1970). Pursuing social initiatives 
also enhances CEO’s image in the eyes of their subordinates. CEO’s are seen as 
visionary by their employees when they emphasize stakeholder values nd autocratic 
when they emphasize economic values (Sully de Luque, Washburn, & Waldman, 2008). 
Thus, it is likely that benefits arising out of CSP are not fully appropriated by the firm 
but, are usurped by managers who gain utility at the expense of shareholders in creating 
a “warm glow” affect around the firm through excess CSP spending (Barnea & Rubin, 
2010).  
Managers also accrue private benefits from socially directed firm expenditures. 
For example, philanthropic giving by the firm provides an opportunity for managers to 
influence the image they present to important stakeholders, advancing their own 
interests while marginalizing the firm’s social image (Haley, 1991). Managers ensure 
their firm’s contributions are reflected as their personal achievement; managers of large 
corporations join relevant associations and socialize with other managers to achieve this 
purpose (Galaskiewicz & Burt, 1991). Therefore, it is possible for the firm’s “good 
deeds” to be overshadowed by managers’ personal image and missed by other 
stakeholders who hold the capacity to reward the firm for its beter corporate social 
conduct. 
Firms with satisfied stakeholders are able to extract better quality inputs from 
their suppliers, buyers and employees. Inputs from these motivates employ es, 
committed buyers and loyal suppliers can help firm’s improve their productivity and 




suggests that powerful internal stakeholders, such as managers, often appropriate the 
rewards from such firm efforts (Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004). CSP spending is also 
often used as a tool by managers to further entrench themselves in the f rm. Inefficient 
managers are known to “play well” with social investors, environmental activists, and 
NGO’s to get into their “good books” and use these vocal stakeholders against the 
threats of takeover by dissatisfied shareholders (Cespa & Cestone, 2007). In doing so, 
managers of inefficient firms protect themselves from being disciplined by the market 
for corporate control (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Strong satisfied stakeholders who are 
accustomed to a generous treatment by collusive management make the firm an 
unattractive target for corporate raiders looking to discipline inefficient firms (Pagano 
& Volpin, 2005). Thus, managers are allowed a “free hand” to indulge in other value-
destroying activities which may result in subsequent reductions n the financial 
performance of the firm (Surroca & Tribó, 2008). Because managerial discretion 
contexts accurately predict when managers can exercise a grater influence on firm 
strategies (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), it follows that manageri l discretion 
contexts will impact the relationship between CSP and CFP. More precisely, in contexts 
where discretion is high, the positive impact of CSP on CFP would be weakened. I 
capture the essence of the arguments made above in the following hypothesis: 
H8: Managerial discretion contexts moderate the relationship between 
CSP and CFP such that, higher the level of managerial discretion 
contexts, weaker the CSP-CFP relationship.. 
CSP and CFP – Sample selection problems. Not all firms find it necessary to 




responsible. Firms may choose to invest in CSP based on a variety of antecedents. For 
example, Chiu and Sharfman (2009) explain that firms’ investments in CSP are a 
function of their visibility in the eyes of their stakeholders. Larger firms, or those firms 
which operate in particularly high-visibility industries, attract more stakeholder 
attention when they lack in their CSP commitment. They also found that higher slack 
resources are a strong predictor of whether a firm engages in CSP. Yet, all these CSP 
antecedents are also related to a firm’s financial performance. For example, size, 
industry membership and slack resources are consistently reliable and strong predictors 
of financial performance of firms (Gooding & Wagner, 1985; Miles, Snow, & 
Sharfman, 1993; Singh, 1986). Thus, the choice of firms to invest in socially 
responsible activities is not independent of a cost-benefit analysis of engaging in CSP. 
In other words, to the extent that the factors that compel firms to engage in CSP are in 
turn associated with a firm’s financial performance, the decision of the firm to invest in 
CSP may be endogenous. An omission of relevant antecedents to CSP in a model 
investigating the CSP-CFP link would introduce a sample selection bias in our estimat  
when only firms that choose to invest in CSP are included (Heckman, 1979). Results 
from such analyses would fail to generalize for all firms because empirical results 
would provide inconsistent estimates derived from analyses of non-random samples 
(Greene, 2008). Therefore, an examination of the CSP-CFP relationship should take 
into account all such factors that impact the firm’s decision to invest in CSP and its 
financial performance. 
An appropriate statistical methodology to resolve the endogeneity of the 




procedure. Specifically, in the first stage of this model, it can be tested whether the 
decision to invest in CSP is indeed endogenous. Subsequent to the results of the test, 
one can proceed to model the CSP-CFP relationship while controlling for the factors 
impacting the CSP investment decision. This procedure is a preferred statistical method 
for resolving sample-selection problems and has been used in management r search to 
explain the inconsistent findings of empirical inquires into the corporate diversification 
and performance, and CEO duality and performance relationships (Campa & Kedia, 
2002; Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009). 
The specific application of the Heckman (1979) selection model to the sample- 
selection endogeneity problem of the CSP-CFP investigation is as follows: 
CFPit = δ0+ δ1Xit+ δ2Ci+eit  (1) 
Equation (1) shows the model used to investigate the financial performance of the firm 
where Xit represents firm characteristics such as size, slack, industry membership etc. 
which are known to affect the performance of the firm. The model includes the 
dichotomous term Ci to denote the decision of the firm i to invest in CSP. Under 
ordinary conditions, OLS estimation of equation (1) would yield unbiased and 
consistent results as long as Ci is exogenous. If however, the decision of firms to invest 
in CSP is not random but is spurred by factors that also affect a firm’s performance, Ci 
will no longer be exogenous and OLS estimation would suffer from a selection bias if 
conducted on samples of only those firms for which CSP is observed. In other words, 
the sample selection hypothesis for CSP states that firms do not randomly decide to 
invest in CSP; rather they choose such investments based on observed or unobserved 




Heckman (1979) shows that the sample selection bias is quite similar to  
specification error where relevant antecedent variables are omitted in a model. 
Following Heckman’s (1979) suggestions, and in order to resolve the selectivity bias, 
Ci
* is determined in a separate model as shown below: 
Ci* = βZit + uit 
      (2) 
Ci = 1 if Ci
* > 0, otherwise Ci = 0 
 
In equation (2) the decision of firms to invest in CSP is representd by Ci
* which is 
determined by another set of firm characteristics in Zit and uit is the error term. In order 
to correctly identify equation (2) we require variables which impact a firm’s decision to 
invest in CSP. As suggested by Chiu and Sharfman (2009), an important and ofte  
overlooked antecedent to CSP is the explicit stakeholder pressure plac d on highly 
visible firms to increase their CSP. Visible firms are also more likely to be included in 
financial indices tracked by investors, and often end up being the only firms included in 
a sample in which the relationship between CSP and CFP is analyzed. The visibility of 
firms also affects the level of social pressure they receiv  (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Research on stakeholder activism through proposal writing indicates that large and 
well-known firms persistently attract more stakeholder proposals th n those firms that 
are relatively smaller and less visible (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Rehbein, Waddock, & 
Graves, 2004). Therefore, I explore stakeholder pressure exerted through stakeholder 
proposals as a relevant antecedent to CSP. I use this antecedent to control for the 





H9: Corporate social performance is positively associated with 
corporate financial performance once sample selection bias is removed. 
In this chapter I provided a literature review of stakeholder activism and 
described how observing other outcomes can help us determine the true 
effectiveness of stakeholder activism. I developed hypotheses linking 
stakeholder pressure to stakeholder governance mechanisms within the firm. I 
introduced managerial discretion contexts as a possible moderator of the 
relationship between stakeholder pressure and stakeholder governance and 
stakeholder pressure and corporate social performance. Finally, I introduced the 
moderating role of managerial discretion in shaping the link between corporate 
social performance and corporate financial performance. I concluded this 
chapter by introducing a methodological correction to research met ods utilized 
in past research to examine the CSP-CFP relationship. In the next chapter, I 
provide details on the data sources I utilized and the sample and variable 






In this chapter, I describe the various data sources that I used to construct 
the samples for testing the hypotheses. I have also provided details on the 
construction of variables and explain the different methods used to test the 
hypotheses. Most of the data used for this dissertation came from publicly 
available archival data sources. Below, I provide detailed descriptions of the 
data sources and my sample selection and variable construction methodology. 
Data Sources 
Stakeholder proposals. The Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC) compiles the shareholder proposal data, which includes all proposals, 
submitted each year to all S&P 1500 firms. IRRC makes the data av ilable 
through Risk Metrics for the past 20 years (1997 through 2007). I used the Risk 
Metrics shareholder proposal database to acquire data on the governance and 
social responsibility proposals received by all firms for all years available in the 
database. Because the aim of this study is to investigate the impact of 
stakeholder proposals, I targeted only those proposals that raised social and 
environmental responsibility issues (SRI).  
Financial data. I gathered firm-level financial data from the Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat North America Database. The Compustat database is th  




13,000 US and international public firms serving almost the entire world’s 
market.  
Corporate social and environmental performance. The corporate social 
performance data was obtained for all firms covered in the Kinder Lydenberg 
and Domini Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) database. KLD is a social choice 
investment advisory firm specializing in evaluating publicly traded firms in the 
United States for their social and environmental performance. The use of KLD 
data to operationalize corporate social and environmental performance is 
pervasive in management research (e.g., Hillman & Keim, 2001; Johnson & 
Greening, 1999; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008; 
Turban & Greening, 1997). CSP ratings from KLD have been assessed for their 
validity (Sharfman, 1996) and this database is considered to be one of the bes  
sources available for social and environmental performance data (Graves & 
Waddock, 1994). 
KLD employs independent analysts who conduct extensive research on 
companies to provide investment advice to socially conscious investors. KLD 
analysts use a variety of data sources to screen firms and compile a rating on 
corporations social and environment responsiveness (SR) or social 
issues/irresponsiveness (SI)4. Analysts gather indicators in five major areas of 
community, diversity, employee relations, product, and environment as shown in 
Table 1, to construct ratings on a scale of 0 to 30 for SR and -30 to 0 for SI.  
                                                
4 The same CSR screening process also yields the Broad Market Social Index (BMSI) launched by KLD 
in 2001. BMSI is a subset of the Russell 3000 index and is comprised of nearly 3000 companies 




Table 1: KLD Dimensions and Their Description 
Strengths    Concerns   
Product     
Benefits to the economically 
disadvantaged 
Antitrust disputes 
Quality   Marketing/Contracting controversies   
R&D innovation   Product safety   
Other strength   Other concern   
 Environment     
Beneficial products & services   Agricultural chemicals 
Clean energy   Climate Change 
Management Systems Strength Hazardous waste   
Pollution prevention   Regulatory problems   
Recycling   Ozone depleting chemicals   
Other strength   Substantial emissions   
 Other concerns 
 Employee relations     
 Cash profit sharing    Union relations  concern 
 Employee involvement    Health and safety  concern 
 Health and safety strength    Workforce reductions   
 Retirement benefits strength    Retirement benefit  concerns 
 Union relations strength    Other concern   
 Other strength     
 Community     
 Charitable giving   Investment  controversies 
 Innovative giving   Negative economic  impact 
 Non-US charitable giving   Tax disputes   
 Support for housing   Other concerns   
 Support for education     
 Volunteer programs strength    
 Other strength    
 Diversity    
CEO   Controversies   
Board of Directors Employee Discrimination 
Promotion Non-representation   
Work/Life benefits Other concerns   
Family benefits    
Women & minority  contracting  
Employment of the disabled     
Gay & Lesbian policies    






Stakeholder governance mechanisms. Data on overall stakeholder 
governance mechanism was obtained from the KLD database. KLD also 
compiles the concerns and strength of several stakeholder-oriented governance 
mechanisms in six related components. (1) Accounting strengths and concerns, 
(2) Strength and concern over limits on top management or board compensation, 
(3) Company ownership of other socially strong or weak companies (4) Quality 
of transparency in reporting on a wide range of social and environmental 
performance measures, (5) Involvement of the company in any noteworthy 
controversies, and (6) Other controversial issues. Table 2 displays the 
stakeholder governance measures and their description.  
Table 2: KLD Stakeholder Governance Measures and Their Description 
Strengths Concerns 
Company recently rewarded low annual 
pay to CEO (< $500,000) or outside 
directors (< $30,000) 
Company recently rewarded high 
annual pay to CEO (> $10mil) or 
outside directors (>$100,000) 
Company owns, or is owned by, another 
company KLD has rated as socially 
strong 
Company owns, or is owned by, 
another company KLD rated  as 
having social concerns. 
Company reports on a wide range of 
social and environmental performance 
measures 
Company is weak in reporting on 
social and environmental 
performance measures 
Company has an exceptional record in 
maintaining transparency and 
accountability when dealing with state or 
federal level US or non-US politics. 
Company is involved in noteworthy 
controversies surrounding its 
involvement in state or federal level 
US or non-US politics. 
Company has a unique and positive 
corporate culture that promotes social 
performance 
Company is involved in controversies 
surrounding its social and 
environmental performance 
 
Company is involved in accounting 
related controversies 




Data on committee structure and composition was obtained from the 
Capital IQ database which provides firm level data on the structure and 
composition of the board of directors, presence of CSR committees and the 
composition of CSR committees for firms that comprise a wide vari ty of stock 
market indexes.  
Dependent Variables 
Corporate social performance. Prior research argues against using a 
consolidated index of CSP and suggests that the strength and weakness rti g  
compiled by KLD conceptually represent distinct constructs (Mattingly & 
Berman, 2006). To construct a measure of social and environmental 
performance, I separately added the strengths and weaknesses scor  for the 
community, diversity, employees, environment and product dimensions shown 
in Table 1. Two sub-variables named CSP strength and CSP weakness were 
created for each firm per year to represent its strengths and weaknesses in 
corporate social and environmental performance over time. CSP strength 
(Cronbach alpha = 0.82) is the sum of a firm’s scores on all five strength 
dimensions shown in Table 1. CSP weakness (Cronbach alpha = 0.7) is the sum 
of the firm’s scores on all five weakness dimensions. To compare my results 
with prior research which largely uses a combined measure of CSP, I created 
CSP overall (Cronbach alpha = 0.5) as the sum of CSP strengths and CSP 
weakness. Cronbach alpha values above 0.7 are generally considered acceptable 




Corporate financial performance.  I followed prior research and in most 
models used the return on assets (ROA) to proxy for firm performance. ROA 
was constructed as the ratio of net income to total assets. I al o checked the 
robustness of the models with other operationalizations of performance as return 
on sales (ROS) constructed as the ratio of net income and sales and return on 
equity (ROE) computed as the ratio of net income and shareholder equity. 
Because these measures are highly correlated with each other, I used these 
variables interchangeably in most models.  
I also used Tobin’s Q as a more “forward-looking” performance measure 
which takes into account the growth opportunities available to firms 
(Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). The ratio is computed as the [market value of 
common stock + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt) / book 
value of total assets], where market value of common stock equals price at year-
end times shares outstanding. In some models, I used an approximation of 
Tobin’s Q presented by Chang and Pruitt (1994) computed as the ratio of market 
value (sum of market value of common equity, book value of preferred stock, 
and book value of debt) to book value of total assets. This approximation is 
highly correlated with Tobin’s Q and has the benefit of requiring fewer variables 
thus improving sample size where observations for some variables are missing. 
Independent Variables 
Stakeholder pressure. Following prior research (David et al., 2007), I 




year. Construction of this variable in this fashion allows me to track 
longitudinally the trend of stakeholder-oriented proposals submitted to a firm.  
Stakeholder governance. Because of the multidimensionality of this 
construct, I used separate strength, weakness, and overall measures of 
stakeholder governance in all models involving this variable. I added th  
strength and concern scores on all stakeholder governance dimensions shown in 
Table 2 separately to construct the stakeholder governance strength and 
stakeholder governance weakness variables. I then added these two variables to 
construct the stakeholder governance overall measure.  
Presence of a CSR committee. This is a dichotomous variable that takes 
on the values of 1 when a company has a committee dedicated to social and 
environmental issues within its board of directors. The existence of such 
committees is indicated in most company texts by express labeling of committee 
names such as “public policy”, “social responsibility” or “sustainab lity issues” 
committees etc. Table 3 provides details on all the CSP dimensions and sub 
dimensions, plus commonly found committee titles in the directors data obtained 
from Capital IQ. The last column of the table shows the keywords I employed to 
match committee names to CSP dimensions. I analyzed the contents of 
committee memberships of directors to match  occurrences of the keywords. The 
variable takes on values of 1 for companies in which there was one such 
committee. For companies in which no directors were found to meet the criteria, 




Table 3: Construction of Presence of a CSR Committee Variable 
CSP dimension Sub-dimensions Committee titles Keywords used 
to construct 
variable 
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Presence of a stakeholder sympathetic member in CSR committee. This 
variable was constructed as a dichotomous variable taking on values of 1 if a 
CSR committee member was deemed sympathetic to stakeholders. The 
determination of whether a director was “stakeholder-sympathetic” was made by 
following prior research (Kesner, 1988; Kosnik, 1990). I examined those 
directors who were a member of a CSR committee and whose current and past 
company affiliations, and occupations matched companies which are rated high 
in corporate social responsibility ratings. This variable was coded as 1 when a 
director within a CSR committee was found to be associated with another firm 
which was ranked in the top quartile of overall CSP scores in prioryears. The 
variable was coded as 0 otherwise. 
Strength of CSR committees. I used the proportion of stakeholder 
sympathetic directors on all CSR committees as a measure of th strength of the 
CSR committees. The proportion of stakeholder sympathetic directors is simply 
the ratio of the number of stakeholder-sympathetic directors on committees with 
the total number of directors in the CSR committees (Luoma & Goodstein, 
1999). Determination of “stakeholder-oriented” directors followed the same 
guidelines as explained in the variable construction of the presence of 
sympathetic members in the committee above.   
Managerial discretion. Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) adopted a 
multi-method approach to validate certain organizational and environmental 
factors with assessments from a panel of business and academic experts. They 




were indeed representative of contexts which impact managerial discretion. 
Given the sensitivity of my constructs of interest to both firm and industry 
factors; corporate social performance or stakeholder governance are likely to be 
influenced by both firm and industry level factors (Orlitzky, 2001), I will 
measure discretion at both levels of analysis.  
Firm size has been used as both a positive and a negative indicator of 
managerial discretion. On one hand, because larger firms are slow to make 
dramatic changes (Aldrich, 1979), they may also engender strong bureaucratic 
structures which put limits on CEO discretion (Mintzberg, 1978). On the o r 
hand, larger firms usually acquire greater market power and can have a 
controlling influence over their task environment allowing managers greater 
discretion (Reid, 1968). Prior research has however indicated that the effects of 
firm size on managerial discretion may be more negative than positive 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Similar to other recent research using ize as 
an indicator of contexts of managerial discretion (Li & Tang, 2010), in this 
dissertation I operationalize firm size as the natural log of assets. As a validity 
check, I also used the natural log of sales to compute firm size. 
Unabsorbed slack is a positive organizational indicator of managerial 
discretion contexts. Slack presents the organization with various options on 
which to act (Cyert & March, 1963), offering managers discretion to choose 
from any of those options (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). I operationalize 
unabsorbed slack as both the current ratio - current assets divided by current 




(Bourgeois, 1981).  Debt is a negative organizational indicator of managerial 
discretion contexts because higher debt may constrain discretionay spending by 
managers (Jensen, 1986). I operationalized debt as the ratio of long term debt to 
total assets and also as the ratio of debt to shareholder’s equity(Lang, Ofek, & 
Stulz, 1996). R&D intensity is another positive indicator of managerial 
discretion contexts. Prior literature informs that research and development is an 
exploratory activity (Cyert & March, 1963). Higher R&D expenses incurred by 
the firm are indicative of greater managerial control over both resource 
allocation and determination of organizational goals (Burgelman & Grove, 
2007). Increased R&D expenditures may also increase the “informati n 
asymmetry” between providers of capital and CEO's increasing CEO’s powers 
over decision making  (Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007). For all these rasons, 
higher R&D is considered a valid organizational indicator of managerial 
discretion contexts (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Following prior research, I 
will operationalize this variable by taking the ratio of R&D exp nses and sales 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989) to minimize the impact of differences in firm sales 
on R&D expenditures. Because R&D expenses are not reported for a large 
number of companies, inclusion of this variable reduced samples size
dramatically reducing the power to observe an effect (Cohen, 1992). I therefore 
filled the missing values of R&D by zeros. In order to ensure that this procedure 
did not introduce a bias in my results, I created a dummy variable RDI that took 




models using R&D intensity also used RDI as a control variable and the co-
efficients were reported if statistically significant. 
Market munificence is an environmental level indicator of high 
managerial discretion contexts. Munificent markets provide more opportunities 
and resources to firms. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argue that in high-
growth industries, firm-level decision making takes on an “entrepreneurial” 
mode (Mintzberg, 1973) allowing managers tremendous “strategic degrees of 
freedom” (Porter, 1980: 230). Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) found market 
growth to be an important determinant of managerial influence over firm profit 
margins. I followed prior research (Boyd, 1990; Keats & Hitt, 1988) and used 
past five year average growth in net sales as an indicator of munificence. 
Following the method outlined by Keats and Hitt (1988) and explained by 
McCleary and Hay (1980), I treated the natural log of industry ales over the 
past five years in a time series, where industry classification was based on the 
two-digit SIC code to which the firm belonged. The variable was computed by 
taking the anti-log of the regression co-efficient. 
Market uncertainty was another environmental level indicator of 
managerial discretion. Competitively unstable markets put greater demands on 
CEOs who in turn use latitude in their decision-making in order to increase their 
role in designing and implementing firm strategies (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 
1987). Following prior research, the volatility of net sales in the industry over 
the past five years was taken as a valid indicator of industry instability (Boyd, 




standard errors of the regression co-efficient obtained during the construction of 
the market munificence variable. 
  Market complexity was used as the third and final environmental 
indicator of managerial discretion contexts. Complex environments usually have 
higher competition and a prevalence of competitors. In highly competitive 
markets, CEO actions are less visible to observers (Zajac & Bazerman, 1991) 
and outcomes may be causally ambiguous. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) 
argue that although environment complexity is a valid indicator of managerial 
discretion contexts, the direction of affect on managers’ discreton cannot be 
unequivocally predetermined. Therefore, I used environment complexity as an 
indicator without an a priori declaration of its direction of impact on managerial 
discretion. I based my computations on the number of competitors in the 
industry (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). Industry concentration was measured by 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) which has been tested to be a v ry 
reliable indicator of industry structure (Bailey & Boyle, 1971). For each industry 
defined by the two-digit SIC code in COMPUSTAT, the index was computed as 
the sum of squared market share of sales of all firms in the industry.  
Control variables. Firm size, debt, firm slack and R&D intensity were 
also used as control variables in most regressions to control for the effect of 
these variables on relevant dependent variables. For all models, industry and 
year effects were controlled. To control for industry effects, the average level of 
the dependent variable in the industry (defined at the two-digit SIC level) 




random-effects models, year effects were introduced using dummy variables and 
remained in the regression if they were jointly significant. For fixed-effects 
panel models, year effects were introduced using two-way fixed-eff cts 
estimation methods (Baum, 2006). The inclusion of time control variables 
enhances the robustness of estimates to contemporaneous autocorrelation (Beck 
& Katz, 1995). 
Analysis 
All models use data on industrial firms only because accounting data on financial 
and non-industrial firms is incomparable with the accounting data on industrial firms. 
Data on firms was retained only if firm assets, sales and R&D expenses were positive. 
To analyze Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, I used cross-sectional logit regression 
analysis because the dependent variables pr ence of a CSR committee and presence of 
stakeholder sympathetic member on CSR committee both take on values of either 0 or 1. 
For analyzing Hypothesis 5, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. I tested the 
residuals of OLS regressions for heteroskedasticity using a Breusch-Pagan / Cook-
Weisberg (Breusch & Pagan, 1979; Cook & Weisberg, 1983) test and whenever the null 
hypothesis of constant variance was rejected, I used the he Huber-Whit  (Huber, 1967; 
White, 1980) sandwich estimator which provides consistent standard errors in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity. I confirmed that using fixes to the White estimator 
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) does not alter the findings. 
 For all the other hypotheses, I used panel data estimation because it offers increa ed 
degrees of freedom and improves the efficiency of estimates by reducing multi-




variables and interaction terms, I followed prior research (Cohen, Cohen, West, & 
Aiken, 2003) and centered predictor variables around their means before creating 
interaction terms. After all regression estimations, I inspected variance inflation factors 
to ensure the average values were well under 2 and the condition number of th  design 
matrix was well under 30 to suggest multi-collinearity did not pose a problem (Belsley, 
Kuh, & Welsch, 1980; Greene, 2008; Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1996). 
Using panel-data techniques also allowed me to model any firm-level time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity. Stable firm characteristics such as firm capabilities, or 
industry-related advantages could exert an influence over corporate s cial performance, 
stakeholder governance, and corporate financial performance. Omission of such 
unobserved effects from my models would cause an endogeneity bias in the estimates. 
Modeling unobserved time-constant  variables as a “fixed-effect” avoids the bias and 
aids in correct inference of statistical results (Greene, 2008). However, whenever 
unobserved characteristics are uncorrelated with regressors, estimat  obtained from a 
fixed-effects estimation are less efficient than those obtained from a random-effects 
estimation (Greene, 2008). Therefore, this conservative estimation tech ique was only 
deployed if time-invariant effects had a statistically signif cant effect within the model. 
A Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) helped me confirm the decision to use either fixed-
effects or random-effects estimation. The null hypothesis of the test states that the 
variables omitted from the model are not related to the independent variables included 
in the model. Wherever I rejected the null hypothesis and problems of end g neity were 
found, I used fixed-effects estimation to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of the 




Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error term can bias the standard 
errors of regression co-efficients which may lead to incorrect inferences. I tested all  
fixed-effects panel-data regression models for group-wise heterosk dasticity by using a 
modified Wald test. The test was  constructed by Greene (2008) and implemented in 
STATA by Baum (2001). I tested for autocorrelation using a method suggested by 
Wooldridge (2002: 282-283). This test is robust in the presence of conditional 
heteroskedasticity and has good size and power in reasonably large samples (Drukker, 
2003). Wherever I found problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correation, I used 
cluster-robust standard errors which are unbiased for clustered correlated panel data 
(Froot, 1989; Williams, 2000; Wooldridge, 2002).  
I used the statistical package STATA 10.0 to run the analyses. The fixed-effects and 
random-effects panel data regressions were implemented using the xtreg command. A 
logit analysis for Hypotheses 2 and 3 was conducted using the logit command. OLS 
regression to test Hypothesis 5 was implemented using the regr ss command. Finally, 






In order to test Hypothesis 1, I took all of the available data on stakeholder 
governance provided by KLD for the years 2005 to 2008 and merged it with stakeholder 
pressure data from Risk Metrics and firm level financial data from COMPUSTAT for 
the years 2004 to 2007 arriving at an initial sample of 1115 observations on 468 firms. 
Using prior years of data to construct the independent and control variables allows for 
stronger arguments in favor of the direction of potential causality from the independent 
variables to the dependent variable. In order for firm observations in a group to be 
meaningful, I restricted the panel to at least three years of consecutive observations per 
firm where data on all variables was available. I ended up with an final unbalanced 
panel of 659 observations on 175 firms over four years. 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the relevant variables in the sample 
based on the year with the most observations (2007). Changing the years do s not 
meaningfully alter the correlation results. The bi-variate correlations between the 
independent variable stakeholder pressure and the three dependent variables, 
stakeholder governance strength, stakeholder governance weakness and stakeholder 
governance overall, are statistically significant (p<0.01). The direction of the 
correlation co-efficient indicates that stakeholder pressure on orgaizations is positively 
associated with the strength of stakeholder governance mechanisms and negatively 
related to the weakness and overall stakeholder governance measures. I employed two-




Table 4: Correlations, Means and Standard Deviations for All Variables Used to Test Hypothesis 1 
 Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Stakeholder pressure 3.19 2.89       
2. Firm size 9.54 1.19 0.507***       
3. Performance 0.07 0.07 0.158* 0.00     
4. Debt 0.22 0.14 -0.121 -0.14 0.342***     
5. Stakeholder governance strength 2.62 2.83 0.313***  0.47***  0.152* -0.234**    
6. Stakeholder governance weakness -5.54 3.28 -0.490***  -0.44***  -0.192* 0.202**  -0.329***   
7. Stakeholder governance overall -1.46 1.79 -0.202**  -0.03 -0.0557 -0.000117 0.493***  0.659***  
N = 175 (for year 2007) 







Hausman (1978) test was rejected (χ2=19.23, p<0.05). The null hypothesis of the Wald 
test suggesting no group-wise heteroskedasticity was also rejected 
(χ2=76328.93, p<0.001) indicating problems of heteroskedasticity. Similarly a test for 
serial correlation rejected the null of no first order serial correlation (F =114.225, 
p<0.001). I therefore report cluster robust standard errors. Table 5 presents the results 
of the panel data regression analysis run in three models, each with the three 
dimensions, strength, weakness and overall of the stakeholder governance dependent 
variable. All models show statistically significant model fit statistics. 
Table 5: Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Testing Hypothesis 1 
Variables Dependent variable: Stakeholder governance 
Strength Weakness Overall 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






















































F 3.557***  15.62***  10.65***  
R2 (within) 0.0753 0.225 0.129 
N= 659, 175 firms over 4 years – unbalanced panel 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust clustered standard errors are in parentheses 





In Table 5, The co-efficient of stakeholder pressure is negative and statistically 
significant (p<0.01) in Model 2 and Model 3 for both stakeholder governance weakness 
and stakeholder governance overall dependent variables respectively. The co-efficient 
of stakeholder pressure fails to achieve statistical significance for the stakeholder 
governance strength dependent variable in Model 1.  The results suggest that although 
stakeholder pressure may be unable to strengthen stakeholder governance measures 
within the firm, it may be successful in improving the weaknesses in takeholder 
governance mechanisms. The negative sign on stakeholder pressure in Model 3 suggests
that perhaps the overall measure for stakeholder governance is more heavily influenced 
by the weakness scores than the strength scores; hence validating our use of strengths, 
weaknesses and overall measures as separate dependent variables.  
Hypothesis 4 investigates the moderating role of managerial discretion on the 
stakeholder pressure and overall stakeholder governance relationship. To test hypothesis 
4, I constructed the organizational and environmental discretion indicators from data  
corresponding to the time frame of stakeholder pressure (2004 to 2007) and merged it 
with the initial sample used to test Hypothesis 1. The resulting sample contained 1076 
observations on 453 unique firms. Table 6 shows the means, standard deviations and 
correlations of the variables used to test Hypothesis 4 for the year 2007, chosen because 
it contained the largest number of observations. Using another year for generating the 
correlation table does not materially change the results. Bi-variate correlations show a 
strong association between the three dimensions of the s akeholder governance 
dependent variable and stakeholder pressure. Correlations between the regressors are 




Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of Variables Used to Test Hypothesis 4 
 Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 
1.Stkhldr gov (s) 2.64 2.79 - 
             
2.Stkhldr gov (w) -5.48 3.29 -0.34 - 
            
3.Stkhldr gov(o) -1.42 1.77 0.48 0.67 - 
           
4.Industry avg (s) -1.4 1.06 -0.03 0.16 0.13 - 
          
5.Industry avg 
(w) 
-5.5 2.09 -0.15 0.28 0.15 0.75 - 
         
6.Indsutry avg (o) -1.4 1.06 -0.03 0.16 0.13 1 0.75 - 
        
7.Performance 
0.07 0.07 0.19 -0.22 -0.05 -0.15 -0.2 -0.15 - 
       
8.Stkhldr pressure 3.15 2.89 0.28 -0.49 -0.24 -0.1 -0.21 -0.1 0.19 - 
      
9.Firm size 9.53 1.19 0.45 -0.44 -0.06 -0.17 -0.25 -0.17 0.04 0.49 - 
     
10.Firm debt 0.21 0.14 -0.26 0.23 0.01 0.14 0.23 0.14 -0.33 -0.14 -0.16 - 
    
11.Firm slack 1.46 0.77 -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.12 0.02 0.29 -0.11 -0.28 -0.27 - 
   








1 0 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.22 -0.14 -0.22 0.22 0.1 0 0.08 0.02 -0.11 -0.32 - 
16.Market  
complexity 
0.07 0.08 -0.15 -0.14 -0.25 -0.4 -0.23 -0.4 0.15 0.11 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.16 -0.05 0.53 
N=166 for year 2007 







meaningful, I limited the sample to those firms which had at least three years of 
consecutive data on all relevant variables. The final sample to tes  Hypothesis 4 
comprised of 664 observations on 176 firms over four years. Year effects w re used in 
all models initially, but dropped later because their joint effect was statistically 
insignificant; keeping the year effects in the regression does not alter the findings.  
I failed to reject the null hypothesis of the Hausman test(χ2=10.4,  p=0.24) 
indicating that random-effects would deliver more efficient estimates than a fixed-
effects estimation. I re-confirmed this decision by running the Sargan-Hansen (1982) 
test of overidentifying restrictions which is robust to conditional heteroskedasticity and 
within-group correlation (Hayashi, 2000). The test statistic failed to achieve statistical 
significance (p=.08) which indicated that the omitted fixed-effects would not cause an 
endogeneity problem in my estimates and I was correct in choosing a random-effects 
estimation over a fixed-effects one (Wooldridge, 2002). As a final check, I also ran a 
Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test for random effects to make sure using a random effects 
estimation was preferred over using a pooled ordinary least square regression. The null 
hypothesis of no random effects was rejected (χ2=293.06,  p<0.001) and therefore I 
proceeded with a random-effects panel data estimation to test Hypothesis 4.  
I ran three separate regressions with the three dimensions of stakeholder 
governance (strength, weakness, and overall) as dependent variables; results are 
presented in Table 7a, 7b and 7c respectively. Within each table, I ran several models, 
starting with the control variables only in Model 1. I then introduced th  independent 
variable in Model 2, and then subsequently entered the organizational level discretion 




Table 7a: Results of Random Effects Estimation of Hypothesis 4 
 Dependent variable: Stakeholder governance strength 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 









































































































































































































































N 640 624 624 624 624 624 
R-sq within 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 
Wald χ2 35.20***  37.59***  91.13***  121.64***  54.11***  145.17***  
166 firms over four years, (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis 







Table 7b: Random Effects Regression Testing Hypothesis 4 
 Dependent variable: Stakeholder governance weakness 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 









































































































































































































































N 640 624 624 624 624 624 
R-sq within 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 
Wald χ2 72.66***  110.59***  150.96***  175.85***  130.95***  208.55***  
166 firms over four years, (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis 







Table 7c: Random Effects Regression Testing Hypothesis 4 
 Dependent variable: Stakeholder governance overall 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 









































































































































































































































N 640 624 624 624 624 624 
R-sq within 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Wald χ2 34.60***  48.34***  52.54***  57.79***  63.03***  79.11***  
166 firms over four years, (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis 
















Model 4. Environment level discretion context variables and their interaction with 
stakeholder pressure were entered in Model 5. Finally, Model 6 within each table 
presents the results of the full model and is used to report the results. The co-efficient of 
stakeholder pressure and its interaction with the organizational or envi onmental 
discretion context variables is only statistically significant i  Table 7b where 
stakeholder governance weakness was used as a dependent variable. The sign on the 
interaction of stakeholder pressure and market munificence is positive. This indicates 
that while the direct effect of stakeholder pressure is to allevi te weaknesses in 
stakeholder governance mechanisms, in munificent environmental contexts where 
managers may exercise more discretion, stakeholder pressure is less effective in 
improving the weaknesses in stakeholder governance mechanisms within the firm. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was confirmed using stakeholder governance mechanisms 
weakness indicators and market munificence denoting managerial discretion contexts. 
For testing Hypothesis 2 and 3, I used the most recently available d ta (2010) on 
director committee memberships. For the independent variable, I used the most recently 
available data on stakeholder pressure (2007)5. The two-year separation between the 
independent and dependent variable serves two purposes. First, the lagged structure of 
our model would allow stronger causal arguments to be made in favor of the direction 
of impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable.  Second, cha ges in 
organization structure due to institutional pressures are likely to meet organizational 
resistance (Oliver, 1991) and hence take some time to manifest themselv s; a period of 
                                                
5 At the time of writing the results of the analyses, Risk Metrics released shareholder proposal data for 
2008 and 2009. Supplemental analyses using the data from the latest available year (2009) are included in 




three years would appear to be sufficient separation between stakeholder pressure and 
subsequent changes within organizational stakeholder governance structures. Control 
variables were constructed using data for the same year as the independent variables. 
The initial sample for testing Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 was constructed by merging 
director committee membership data for 1055 firms with stakeholder pressure data on 
212 (385 for the year 2009) firms resulting in a final merged sample of data on 78 (136 
for the year 2009) firms. 
In order to account for the effect of firm size on the existence of a CSR 
committee I took the natural log of total directors in the company. Debt and 
performance were also used as control variables to remove organizational influences on 
the dependent variables. To remove the effect of industry, I computed the average 
number of directors in the industry excluding the number of directors in the focal firm. 
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables us d to test Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3. Bi-variate correlations between both dependent variables: presence of a 
CSR committee and presence of a stakeholder sympathetic member on the CSR 
committee, with stakeholder pressure, firm size and industry effects are positive and 
statistically significant. 
Table 9 presents the results of the logit analysis with the presence of a CSR 
committee as a dependent variable. Results are presented for stakeholder pressure and 
control variables constructed from both 2007 and 2009 in separate columns labeled 
respectively. Because logit estimation is quite sensitive to heteroskedasticity (Davidson 
& MacKinnon, 1993) I have reported robust standard errors for statisticl inference. I 





Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used to Test Hypothesis 2, 3 and 5 
Variables Means s.d.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Presence of a CSR committee .45 .50  -       
2. Presence of a stakeholder 
sympathetic member on the CSR 
committee 
0.40 0.50  0.90***  -      
3. Strength of CSR committee 0.18 0.22  0.89***  0.81***  -     
4.Stakeholder pressure 1.92 1.76  0.38***  0.35**  0.25* -    
5. Firm size 2.44 .38  0.30**  0.32**  0.20 0.30**  -   
6. Industry effects 12.06 1.50  0.39***  0.39***  0.32**  0.39***  0.26* -  
7. Debt .19 .13  -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.18 -0.12 -0.02 - 
8. Performance .08 .07  0.09 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.15 -0.29* 
N=78 









Table 9: Result of Logistic Regression Testing Hypotheses 2 
 Dependent Variable: Presence of a CSR committee on 
the board of directors, 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
Independent 
variables 
Past pressure (2007) Recent pressure (2009) 


























N 78 136 
Wald χ2   15.54***  12.00* 
Pseudo R2 0.224 0.0927 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01, ***  p < 0.001 
 
Table 10: Result of Logistic Regression Testing Hypotheses 3 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: Presence of stakeholder 
sympathetic member, 1=Yes, 0 = No 
Past pressure (2007) Recent pressure (2009) 


























N 78 136 
Wald χ2 16.74**  14.30* 
Pseudo-R2 0.229 0.101 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses 




models because of its similarity with the R2 of OLS regressions (Veall & Zimmermann, 
1996).  Based on these results, Hypothesis 2 was confirmed; stakeholder pressure is 
positively associated with the presence of a CSR committee in the firm. Note that the 
estimates from the analysis using stakeholder pressure and control variable data from 
2009 has a similar positive sign but is not statistically significant. These results may 
lend support to my choice of using a two year lag as a reasonable estimate of the 
strategy implementation horizon of these organizations.  
Hypothesis 3 changes the dependent variable to the presence of a stakeholder 
sympathetic member on the CSR committee. Table 10 presents the results of the logit 
regression testing Hypothesis 3. The results indicate that stakeholder pressure has a 
positive impact on the presence of a stakeholder sympathetic member on the CSR 
committee. Using stakeholder pressure data from 2009 does not change the direction of 
this positive effect. However, the co-efficients of regression estimates are not 
statistically significant and hence, Hypothesis 3 was not confirmed. In order to confirm 
whether I lacked the statistical power to detect an effect (Cohen, 1992), I ran a power 
analysis tailored for logistic regressions (Friendly, 2001). The test results indicate that 
with high probabilities of the presence of stakeholder sympathetic member in the 
committee at both the mean and mean plus one standard deviation values of stakeholder 
pressure, I needed at least 300 observations to detect an effect. 
Hypothesis 5 proposes that the organizational and environmental discretion 
variables will moderate the relationship between stakeholder pressure and the strength 
of CSR committees. I used data from 2008 to construct the organizational and 




Table 11: Result of OLS Regression Testing Hypothesis 5 
  Dependent variable: Strength of CSR committee 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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N 78 75 78 
R2 0.13 0.23 0.16 
F 4.73**  4.69***  5.73***  
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 





testing Hypothesis 5. None of the main effects or interaction terms with either the 
organizational or the environmental variables are significant. Therefor  Hypothesis 5 
was not supported. 
In Hypothesis 6, I am interested in finding out whether stakeholder govenance 
mechanisms carry over the influence of stakeholder pressure to CSP. To construct the 
sample, I merged the stakeholder pressure data from 2004 to 2007 with the KLD data 
on stakeholder governance and CSP from 2005 to 2008 in order for the direction of 
potential causality to remain from the independent variable to the dep n nt variable. 
The resulting merged sample contained 1115 observations on 468 unique firms. The 
sample was further reduced to 660 observations on 175 firms upon imposing the 
requirement of at least three consecutive observations for each firm for inclusion in the 
sample. I confined the data to at least three consecutive observations per firm because I 
planned to use a lagged dependent variable in the model. Past CSP is an extremely 
strong predictor of current CSP and omission of this variable would seriou ly bias the 
results. To confirm the inclusion of this variable, I conducted a Ramsey (1969) 
regression specification error test without the first lag of CSP. I rejected the null 
hypothesis (p<0.05)  which states that there are no omitted variables in the regression. 
Once the first lag of CSP was included, I failed to reject the null (p=0.18). I included all 
other previously identified control variables to account for the impact of firm size, debt, 
performance, firm slack and R&D intensity on the CSP of a firm. Year effects were 
included but were found to be jointly insignificant and were hence removed from the 
model. I ran a Breusch-Pagan (1979) test and rejected the null hypothesis of 




Table 12: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of Variables Used to Test Hypothesis 6 
 
Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
CSP strength 5.18 2.85 - 
              
CSP 
weakness 
-5.71 3 -0.24 - 
             
CSP overall -0.27 1.8 0.59 0.64 - 
            
Stakeholder 
pressure 
3.16 2.91 0.32 -0.55 -0.2 - 




2.63 2.8 0.66 -0.3 0.27 0.28 - 




-5.5 3.3 -0.38 0.37 0.01 -0.49 -0.33 - 




-1.43 1.77 0.17 0.11 0.22 -0.24 0.48 0.67 - 




5.18 1.75 0.41 0.04 0.36 0.17 0.18 -0.18 -0.02 - 




-5.71 1.78 0.04 0.29 0.28 -0.28 -0.02 0.08 0.06 -0.09 - 




-0.27 1.19 0.33 0.25 0.47 -0.09 0.12 -0.07 0.03 0.67 0.68 - 
     
Firm size 9.54 1.2 0.5 -0.64 -0.13 0.49 0.45 -0.44 -0.06 0.15 -0.31 -0.12 - 
    
Performance 0.07 0.07 0.24 0.05 0.23 0.19 0.19 -0.22 -0.05 0.17 0.05 0.16 0.04 - 
   
Debt 0.21 0.14 -0.34 -0.15 -0.39 -0.14 -0.26 0.22 0 -0.22 -0.09 -0.23 -0.15 -0.33 - 
  




0.03 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.02 0.05 -0.1 -0.05 0.41 0.05 0.34 -0.04 -0.2 -0.12 0.48 - 
R&D missing 0.38 0.49 -0.26 -0.16 -0.34 -0.11 -0.13 0.22 0.1 -0.34 -0.21 -0.41 0.09 -0.18 0.31 -0.35 -0.29 
N=164, for year 2007. 






were used and are reported. After the estimation, I conducted the Arellano-Bond (1991) 
test of autocorrelation and failed to reject the null hypothesis for both first (p=0.25) and 
second (p=0.65) order auto-correlated disturbances. The results of this test suggest that 
serial correlation was not a problem and it alleviated concerns of u ing the lag of the 
dependent variable as an independent variable in the regression (Keele & Kelly, 2006). 
As before, I ran three separate tests with CSP strengths, weakness and overall as 
dependent variable, stakeholder governance strength weakness and overall measures as 
the mediating variable respectively and stakeholder pressure as th independent variable 
in all models. Table 12 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
variables used to test Hypothesis 6. The year 2007 was chosen because it h d the largest 
number of observations; choosing another year for running the correlati n analysis does 
not change the findings. Because lagged CSP variables are highly correlated with CSP 
by construction, they have been omitted from the table. All other variables exhibit 
correlations within acceptable limits. I ran collinearity diagnostics after the regression 
analysis. Because the mean VIF was 1.5 and all the individual VIF values were under 2, 
I found no concern for issues stemming from multicollinearity. 
 In Hypothesis 6, I proposed that stakeholder governance mechanisms will 
mediate the relationship between stakeholder pressure and CSP. Researchers define a  
mediator as a variable that accounts for all or part of the direct relationship between an 
independent variable and a dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). To assess the 
effect of mediation, I followed the recommendations of Judd and Kenny (1981) and as a 




Table 13: Results of OLS Regression Testing Hypothesis 6 
 CSP strength CSP weakness CSP overall 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 































































































































































































R2 0.908 0.909 0.913 0.878 0.880 0.881 0.859 0.862 0.864 
F 556.50***  514.17***  488.59***  377.23***  352.30***  332.13***  331.67***  310.46***  277.47***  
N = 452, 162 firms over three years 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year effects were jointly insignificant. A constant was used but co-efficients are not reported. 






both stakeholder pressure and stakeholder governance. This two-step proc dure is 
quantitatively similar to the method recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) in which 
an addition step is included after the first step involving a regression of the dependent 
variable on the mediating variable. The two methods “yield identical estimates of 
mediation when the dependent variable is continuous and ordinary regression is used” 
(MacKinnon, Warsi, & Dwyer, 1995: 45), as is the case in this analysis. 
I present the results of the OLS regression I ran to test Hypothesis 6 in Table 13;  
I ran three separate models for each dimension of the dependent variable. Model 1, 
Model 2 and Model 3 present the results with CSP strength as the dependent variable, 
Model 4, Model 5 and Model 6 present the results with CSP weakness as the dependent 
variable. Finally, Model 7, Model 8 and Model 9 present the results with CSP overall as 
the dependent variable. In the first model of each set (Model 1, Model 4 and Model 7), I 
entered all the control variables identified in prior research. In the second model (Model 
2, Model 5 and Model 8), I entered the stakeholder pressure variable to determine if it 
could incrementally explain changes in CSP. Finally, in the third mo el of each set 
(Model 3, Model 6 and Model 9), I included the mediating variable stakeholder 
governance mechanisms. In Table 13, results indicate that the effect o  stakeholder 
pressure on CSP is indeed mediated by strengths and weaknesses in stakeholder 
governance mechanisms. 
While the methods outlined by Judd and Kenny (1981) and Baron and Kenny 
(1986) allow researchers to test meditational hypotheses, the Sobel-G odman mediation 
tests allows researchers to assess the statistical significance of the mediation effect. 




employed a Sobel-Goodman mediation test to ascertain whether stakeholder governance 
carried the impact of stakeholder pressure to CSP. In Table 14, I have presented the 
results of three mediation significance tests, run on all three dependent variables 
separately. In all tests, co-variates shown in Table 13 were also included. The co-
efficients of the three tests are statistically significant (p<0.05) for CSP overall; 16% of 
the total effect of stakeholder pressure on CSP overall is mediated by overall 
stakeholder governance. In other words, stakeholder governance partially mediates the 
relationship between stakeholder pressure and CSP.  
Table 14: Results of Sobel-Goodman Tests 
 Dependent variable: CSP 
 
Strength Weakness Overall 
Sobel -0.84 -1.91 -2.15* 
Goodman-1 -0.83 -1.88 -2.09* 
Goodman-2 -0.86 -1.94* -2.20* 
Proportion of total effect mediated  0.10 0.19 0.16 
N=452 
* p < 0.05, **  p < 0.01, ***  p < 0.001 
 
In Hypothesis 7, I proposed that managerial discretion contexts moderate the 
relationship between stakeholder pressure and CSP. In order to test the Hypothesis, I 
merged data on managerial discretion context variables taken from 2004 to 2007 to 
correspond with data on stakeholder proposals from 2004 to 2007. I matched this data 
to CSP data for the years 2005 to 2008 to maintain temporal separation be ween the 
independent and the dependent variables. The resulting sample consisted of 1115 
observations on 468 firms. As before, I ensured that each firm had at least hree years of 
data on all variables. The final merged sample used to run the analysis con isted of  664 




descriptive statistics and correlations between variables for the year 2007, chosen 
because it had the largest number of observations. Correlations based on other years do 
not differ significantly from those presented in Table 15. I also ran collinearity 
diagnostics and determined that the condition index of the design matrix was 21, a value 
much lower than the recommended threshold of 30 indicating there were lik ly no 
problems of multicollinearity (Belsley et al., 1980). I tested for endogeneity due to 
omitted variables and rejected the null of the Hausman test (χ2=242.20, p<0.001). 
Because year effects were also jointly significant I proceeded with the conservative 
two-way fixed-effects panel data estimation method. All models were tested for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. I rejected the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity specified by the Wald test (χ2=612.58, p<0.001). The null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation using Wooldridge’s (2002) test was also rejected (F=43.54, 
p<0.001). Therefore, I used and have reported cluster-robust standard erro s. Results of 
the estimation with the three dependent variables, CSP strength, CSP weakness and 
CSP overall are presented in Table 16a, 15b and 15c respectively. 
For each dependent variable, I ran the regression first with only the control 
variables and present those results in Model 1 of the respective table. In Model 2, I have 
shown the results of adding  the independent variable stakeholder pressure into the 
regression. Model 3 in each table shows the results of including the main and 
interaction effects of organizational discretion variables and stakeholder pressure. 
Model 4 shows the main and interaction effects of environmental discretion variables 





Table 15: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation of Variables Used to Test Hypothesis 7 
 Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.CSP strength 5.19 2.84 - 
             
2.CSP weakness -5.74 3.01 -0.24 - 
            
3.CSP overall -0.28 1.8 0.59 0.65 - 
           
4.Mean industry CSPs 5.19 1.75 0.41 0.05 0.36 - 
          
5.Mean industry CSPw -5.74 1.79 0.05 0.28 0.27 -0.09 - 
         
6.Mean industry CSP -0.28 1.19 0.33 0.24 0.47 0.67 0.69 - 
        
7.Stakeholder pressure 3.16 2.9 0.32 -0.55 -0.21 0.17 -0.27 -0.08 - 
       
8.Firm size 9.54 1.19 0.5 -0.63 -0.13 0.15 -0.31 -0.12 0.48 - 
      
9.Debt 0.21 0.14 -0.34 -0.14 -0.38 -0.22 -0.08 -0.22 -0.14 -0.15 - 
     
10.Performance 0.07 0.07 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.19 0.04 -0.33 - 
    
11.Firm slack 1.46 0.77 -0.02 0.27 0.2 0.29 0.28 0.42 -0.1 -0.28 -0.27 0.29 - 
   
12.R&D intensity 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.26 0.4 0.06 0.34 0.02 -0.04 -0.12 -0.2 0.49 - 
  
13.Market munificence 1.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.24 0.11 0.14 0.08 - 
 
14.Market uncertainty 1 0 -0.07 -0.13 -0.17 -0.12 -0.23 -0.26 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.22 0.02 -0.11 -0.32 - 
15.Market complexity 0.07 0.08 -0.13 -0.1 -0.18 -0.21 -0.16 -0.28 0.12 -0.05 -0.07 0.15 0.04 -0.15 -0.05 0.53 
N=165, for year 2007 








Table 16a: Fixed-Effects Panel Data Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 7 
 Dependent variable: CSP strength 
 Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a 













































































































































































































R2 (within) 0.234 0.235 0.244 0.274 0.283 
F 17.36***  14.74***  8.228***  8.513***  6.030***  
N=455, 165 firms over three years, unbalanced panel. 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 
Two-way fixed effects were used, year effects were jointly significant in all models, co-efficients not reported. 







Table 16b. Fixed-Effects Panel Data Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 7  
 Dependent variable: CSP weakness  
 Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b 













































































































































































































R2 (within) 0.176 0.178 0.223 0.205 0.251 
F 9.068***  7.600***  5.004***  6.218***  5.687***  
N=455, 165 firms over three years, unbalanced panel. 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 
Two-way fixed effects were used, year effects were jointly significant in all models, co-efficients not reported. 







Table 16c. Fixed-Effects Panel Data Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 7  
 Dependent variable: CSP overall  
 Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c Model 5c 













































































































































































































R2 (within) 0.0481 0.0500 0.101 0.0657 0.117 
F 3.546***  3.017***  3.171***  2.478***  3.010***  
N=455, 165 firms over three years, unbalanced panel. 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 
Two-way fixed effects were used, year effects were jointly significant in all models, co-efficients not reported. 









the regression on the full model with all the variables included and was used to report 
the findings. Based on the results of the regression, the interaction of stakeholder 
pressure with one organizational discretion variable (R&D intensity in Table 16c) and 
one environmental discretion context variable (market uncertainty in Table 16a) is 
statistically significant at p<0.05. However because the main effect of stakeholder 
pressure on CSP in those models is not statistically significant, I will not attempt to 
interpret the moderation effects; Hypothesis 7 was therefore not confirmed. 
In Hypothesis 8, I proposed that managerial discretion contexts moderate the 
relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate fin ncial 
performance (CFP). In order to test the hypothesis, I merged CSP data on all available 
years (2005 to 2008) with firm financial performance data from 2006 to 2009. The 
temporal separation would allow me to make a causal argument in favor of CSP 
impacting CFP and not the other way around. The organizational and environmental 
discretion variables were gathered for years corresponding to years for which CSP data 
was available (2005 to 2008). The initial merged sample consisted of 6109 observations 
on 1970 firms over four years. As before, in order to ensure there are no gaps in the 
time series, each firm was required to have at least threeconsecutive years of data to be 
included in the sample. I dropped extreme values for the dependent variable and some 
independent variables to ensure that no single observation or set of observations 
influences the regression estimates. The final sample contained 3423 observations on 
1144 firms. The use of a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable reduced 




Table 17: Descriptive Statistics And Correlations For Variables Used To Test Hypothesis 8 
Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.ROA 0 0.17 - 
2.Mean industry ROA 0 0.04 0.13 - 
3.CSP strength 2.1 2.22 0.14 0.07 - 
4.CSP weakness -2.36 1.99 -0.07 -0.13 -0.46 - 
5.CSP overall -0.13 1.1 0.07 -0.05 0.59 0.44 - 
6.Firm size 7.37 1.6 0.22 0.14 0.61 -0.63 0.05 - 
7.Debt 0.4 0.18 0 -0.05 0.13 -0.18 -0.03 0.32 - 
8.Firm slack 2.43 1.93 -0.01 -0.05 -0.23 0.3 0.04 -0.48 -0.49 - 
9.R&D intensity 0.06 0.23 -0.26 -0.03 -0.05 0.14 0.07 -0.34 -0.11 0.31 - 
10.R&D missing 0.38 0.49 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.14 -0.21 0.1 0.14 -0.26 -0.22 - 
11.Market munificence 1.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11 0.05 0.03 0.04 - 
12.Market uncertainty 1 0 0.06 0.23 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.11 0.06 -0.32 - 
13.Market complexity 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.21 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.15 0.05 -0.05 -0.14 -0.05 -0.17 0.55 
N=1056 for year 2008 









Table 18a: Fixed-Effects Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 8 
 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Return on assets 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a 
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R2 0.146 0.146 0.163 0.147 0.164 
F 44.80***  38.42***  16.96***  18.01***  12.11***  
N = 3107 observations – 1056 firms over four years (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 









Table 18b: Fixed-Effects Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 8 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Return on assets 
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b 



































































































































































































R2 0.146 0.147 0.164 0.147 0.164 
F 44.80***  35.86***  15.24***  16.68***  10.92***  
N = 3107 observations – 1056 firms over four years (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 18c: Fixed-Effects Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 8 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Return on assets 
Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c Model 5c 
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R2 0.146 0.146 0.162 0.147 0.163 
F 44.80***  37.33***  16.07***  17.39***  11.49***  
N = 3107 observations – 1056 firms over four years (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 18d: Fixed-Effects Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 8 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
Model 1d Model 2d Model 3d Model 4d Model 5d 
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R2 0.287 0.287 0.332 0.288 0.334 
F 176.8 141.4 56.62 65.59 40.26 
N = 3620 observations – 1259 firms over four years (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 








Table 18e: Fixed-Effects Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 8 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
Model 1e Model 2e Model 3e Model 4e Model 5e 
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R2 0.287 0.287 0.333 0.289 0.335 
F 176.8 144.0 56.61 67.33 41.51 
N = 3620 observations – 1259 firms over four years (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 18f: Fixed-Effects Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 8 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
Model 1f Model 2f Model 3f Model 4f Model 5f 
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R2 0.287 0.288 0.334 0.289 0.336 
F 176.8 143.9 56.21 67.00 40.63 
N = 3620 observations – 1259 firms over four years (unbalanced panel) 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors in parentheses 







1056 (1259 for Tobin’s Q) firms. Descriptive statistics and correlations for the year 
2008 (with the largest number of observations) are presented in Table 17. Changing the. 
year for which correlations are tested does not change the findings. Overall, all 
variables have reasonable correlations amongst each other. Collinearity diagnostics 
reveal that the condition number for the design matrix is well under 30. I ran tests of 
endogeneity, heteroskedasticity plus  serial correlation and rejected the null for all of 
them. I therefore proceeded with two-way fixed-effects estimation with cluster-robust 
standard errors. 
For each dimension of CSP strength, weakness, and overall a separte set of 
models was analyzed and the results are presented in Table 18a, 18b and 18c 
respectively. In each table, Model 1 only included the control variables. Model 2 
introduced the effect of the independent variable. Model 3 introduced the organization 
discretion indicators and their interactions with CSP, Model 4 repeat d the same with 
environment discretion variables. Finally, Model 5 presents the results of the full model 
including all variables. Based on the results of the analysis, none of th  rganizational 
or the environmental discretion indicators moderate the relationship between CSP and 
Performance. These results indicate that when all other relevant factors such as 
specification errors and assumption violations are controlled, the relationship between 
CSP and CFP is reduced to statistical insignificance. Therefore Hypothesis 8 could not 
be confirmed using ROA as an operationalization for firm performance. 
I conducted a power test using the powerreg command in STATA 10.0. The 
results indicated that I had sufficient statistical power to detect an effect in a regression 




all models using ROS and ROE as dependent variables but the results were not 
materially different and hence are not reported. I then used Tobin’s Q a a dependent 
variable in the same regressions. The results are presented again in three separate tables, 
Table 18d, 18e and 18f, each testing CSP strength, CSP weakness and CSP overall as 
the key independent variable and organizational and environmental discretion indicators 
as potential moderators of the relationship between CSP and performance. Based on the 
results in Table 18c, while overall CSP emerged as a statistic lly significant predictor of 
performance (p<0.05) none of the interactions with either the organization or the 
environmental discretion variables turned out to be statistically significant. Therefore 
Hypothesis 8 is rejected using all generally accepted operationalizations of firm 
performance. 
Finally, in Hypothesis 9, I test whether the relationship between CSP and CFP 
suffers from a sample selection problem. In order to test this hypothesis, I followed 
prior research (Campa & Kedia, 2002; Heckman, 1979) and adopted a three-step 
approach. In the first step I estimated the CSP-CFP relationship in a sample with all 
industrial firms that report financial performance regardless of their selection into KLD 
CSP rankings. In the second step, I took the probability of a firm’s CSP being rated by 
KLD as a proxy for a firm’s decision to engage in CSP, and determined the antecedents 
of this decision. In particular, as hypothesized, I use stakeholder pressure as a likely 
factor impacting a firm’s decision to engage in CSP. I saved th  predicted results and 
after applying statistical transformations, used the transformed variable in a regression 
predicting the relationship between CSP and CFP. The final step is carr ed out  in a 




I effectively replicated prior work which has used only those firms whose CSP ratings 
are ranked by KLD to investigate the CSP-CFP relationship. However, the results of my 
estimation would include the statistical correction I have applied by accounting for the 
endogenous decision of firms to engage in CSP. Thus the results from this regression 
would provide the unbiased estimates and correct inferences of the direction of 
relationship between CSP and CFP having accounted for the endogeneity problem of 
self selection (Heckman, 1979). 
 I began by merging all the available CSP data (2005-2008) from KLD with all 
the available financial data on industrial firms from COMPUSTAT for the years 2006 
to 2009 in order to keep the direction of potential causality from CSPto CFP. The 
initial merged sample contained I then merged data on stakeholder resolutions from 
Risk Metrics for the years 2004 to 2007 in order to retain the direction of potential 
causality from stakeholder pressure to CSP. I also merged control variable for various 
steps of the estimation process. In order to estimate the CSP-CFP relationship, 
organizational level control variables were constructed to coincide with the duration of 
the independent variable CSP (2005 to 2008). When estimating the stakeholder pressure 
and CSP regressions, I used organizational control variables contemporaneous to 
stakeholder pressure for the years 2004 to 2007.  
The merging of CSP data with CFP data resulted in 9909 observations. As 
before, I limited the sample to at least three consecutive years of data on all variables 
for each firm. I used Tobin’s Q to denote market-based financial performance of the 
firm. I also included the lagged values of the dependent variable plus past accounting 




Because I found problems of endogeneity due to omitted variables, group-wise 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, I used the two-way fixed-effects estimation 
method and have reported cluster-robust standard errors. The final samp e used to run 
the first stage of the regressions consisted of 9754 observations on 2591 firms over four 
years (actual date ranges from year 2004 to 2009 for different variables). 
As a first step, I created a dichotomous variable decision to engage in CSP 
which took on values of 1 if the CSP ratings were available and reported by KLD; the 
variable was coded zero otherwise. In Table 19, I have reported the results of the 
regression using the decision to engage in CSP as a predictor of firm performance. In 
Model 1, I only entered the primary control variables. In Model 2, I added th  predictor 
variable and it was statistically significant (p<0.05) indicating the main effect of CSP 
on CFP. I then tested the robustness of my specification by introducing the lagged 
values of performance in Model 3 and the first lag of the dependent variable in Model 4 
respectively. I then ensured that the predictor remains a significant variable if added 
after these control variables were included in the model. Model 5 shows the results of 
the regression run with the addition of predictor variables and Model 6 shows the full 
model when the predictor is entered as the final variable in the regr ssion. These results 
appear to indicate that there is a statistically significant negative relationship between a 
firm’s decision to engage in CSP and financial performance (p<0.05).  
In the second step, I used the d cision to engage in CSP variable as a dependent 
variable and used several possible predictor variables identified in prior research in a 
probit model. A probit model is recommended in the second step (Heckman, 1979)




Table 19: Fixed-Effects Regression Results Testing Hypothesis 9 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
































































































R2 (within) 0.312 0.313 0.316 0.326 0.328 0.329 
F 336.0***  296.7***  265.8***  246.6***  265.5***  241.6***  
N=9754, 2591 firms over four years, unbalanced panel 
Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust cluster standard errors in parentheses.  








Table 20:  Heckman Selection Model Testing Hypothesis 9 
 Tobin’s Q Decision to engage in CSP Tobin’s Q 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
















































































































N 9754 9711 9711 4548 
Pseudo R2  0.297 0.306  
χ
2  2080.3 1944.8  
R2 (within) 0.329   0.360 
F 241.6***    156.1***  
Heteroskedasticity robust errors are shown in parentheses 
Year effects were used in all regressions, co-effici nts are not displayed 





of this step is to account for possible explanations for a firm’s decision to engage in 
CSP. I limited the sample to those observations over which I had earlier investigated the 
models in Table 19, in order to reduce other differences between samples. Thus Model 
1 in Table 20 is run on the full sample of 9754 observations. Model 2 and Model 3 use 
stakeholder pressure and therefore the total number of observations is reduced to 9711. 
Finally, in Model 4, the sample comprises only those observations for which the 
variable decision to engage in CSP takes on values of 1.  
To test Hypothesis 9, I also introduced the role of stakeholder pressure on fi ms 
as a relevant predictor of the decision of a firm to engage in CSP. The results of this 
analysis are presented in Table 20.  In Model 1 of Table 20, I repeated the regression 
analysis presented in Table 19 as a starting point to establish sample parameters over 
which further investigation will proceed. In this model, Tobin’s Q serves as the 
dependent variable. As displayed, the co-efficient of the decision to engage in CSP 
variable is negative and statistically significant (p<0.05). This result replicates the main 
results shown in Table 19. In Model 2, I ran a probit estimation with the decision to 
engage in CSP as the dependent variable and entered accepted and established 
predictors of a firm’s decision to engage in  CSP as control variables. In Model 3, I 
introduced the role of stakeholder pressure as a relevant predictor of firm’s decision to 
engage in CSP. As shown, the co-efficient of stakeholder pressure variable is positive 
and statistically significant (p<0.05). This indicates that the pressure on firm’s to 
engage in CSP is indeed a factor in firms’ decision to pursue social performance. 
Finally, In Model 4, I use the statistically corrected variable lambda, which accounts for 




relationship between CSP and CFP. This regression is estimated over only those 
observations for which CSP data is available from KLD, i.e. observations for which 
decision to engage in CSP takes on values of 1. The results of this regression show that 
the co-efficient of lambda is positive and statistically significant (p<0.05). This means 
that the relationship between CSP and CFP is indeed a positive one after sample-
selection error is removed. Thus, Hypothesis 9 was supported using Tobin’s Q as a 
measure of financial performance.  
 I attempted to replicate these results with other indicators of performance but the 
results with Tobin’s Q as an indicator of financial performance present the clearest 
picture of the dynamics of a sample selection problem in the investigation of the CSP-
CFP relationship. In the next chapter, I discuss the results of my analysis and how these 
results relate to my theory and the broader investigation into the relationship between 






In this dissertation, I looked deeper into the relationship between stakeholder 
pressure and CSP. I argued that one possible reason there is an ambiguity surrounding 
this relationship could be the presence of intervening factors. Prior research questions 
whether activism by shareholders directed at improving an organizatio ’s social and 
environmental performance meets its goals, i.e., improves the CSP of firms (Sjöström, 
2008) . Results of such investigations are mixed and researchers acknowledge that it is 
difficult to observe direct changes in organizational behavior in response to stakeholder 
activism, and compliance may take other forms (Lee, 2008).  To better und rstand the 
outcomes of stakeholder pressure, I focused specifically on the role of stakeholder 
governance mechanisms. Departing from the various theoretical approaches used in 
prior literature, I used an agency theory framework (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) to hypothesize that pressure on firms to increase their social and 
environmental performance is at least successful in achieving structural changes within 
the firm concerning stakeholder governance mechanisms, if not achieving the ultimate 
goal of improving CSP. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical study in 
a US setting to investigate explicitly stakeholder governance related outcomes of 
stakeholder pressure, and to establish boundary conditions of this relationship. 
The results demonstrate that stakeholder pressure is associated with the quality 
of overall stakeholder governance within the firm. In particular, pressur  exerted by 




committees to address the concerns of stakeholders. Strategic choice scholars have long 
acknowledged the power held by external constituents to influence structural hanges 
within the organization (Child, 1997). Institutional theorists too have suggested the 
possibility of organizations strategically complying with stakeholders’ demands without 
sacrificing precious resources (Oliver, 1991). The findings in this study are consistent 
with these arguments. I find that pressure from stakeholders is successful in changing 
the structure of stakeholder governance mechanisms. From an organizational point of 
view, response to stakeholder pressure comes in the form of altered internal structures 
that may be relatively less costly to change than improving CSP which requires 
discretionary spending and in turn raises costs (Friedman, 1970).  
The results of the stakeholder pressure and overall stakeholder gov nance 
relationship tests also reveal that stakeholder pressure is only succes ful in improving  
weaknesses in stakeholder governance mechanisms, not in augmenting governance 
strengths. Stakeholder pressure had a positive impact on stakeholder governance 
weaknesses, but there was no association between stakeholder pressure and stakeholder 
governance strengths. This implies that firms react to stakehold r pressure by focusing 
only on areas of concerns within their stakeholder governance mechanisms. These 
results mirror the findings of the shareholder activism literature in which researchers 
found that stakeholder pressure was most successful in removing weaknesses in 
corporate governance mechanisms such as the existence of poison pill (Gillan & 
Starks, 2007). Evidence from recent stakeholder proposal activity also indicates that 
firms are increasingly improving their environmental disclosure practices to pacify 




improvements signals compliance to stakeholders who subsequently agree to withdraw 
resolutions. Thus, while these results confirm the utility and succes of stakeholder 
activism in bringing about organizational changes, they also highlight the reality that 
overall, stakeholder pressure may not induce more positive organization behavior but 
rather a less negative one. 
The tests of mediation concerning the stakeholder pressure and CSP also 
confirm the theory presented in this dissertation. Stakeholder governance mechanisms 
do at least partially mediate the stakeholder pressure and CSP relationship and the 
relative magnitude of the total effect that is mediated could be as high as 20%. To 
recast, while changes in stakeholder governance mechanisms may not ccount for all 
the impact of stakeholder pressure on CSP, they at least channel some of that effect. In 
light of these results, it may be useful to explore organizational structures related to 
social issue handling when researching processes that lead to changes in an 
organization’s CSP. Much of the research on CSP antecedents is centered around 
organizational variables such as firm size, need for legitimacy and slack resources (Chiu 
& Sharfman, 2009). Inclusion of stakeholder governance mechanisms could possibly 
provide additional explanations for why firms engage in CSP.    
In this study, I contributed to both stakeholder theory and corporate governanc  
literatures. Corporate governance is more commonly referred to as the “structures and 
processes by which an organization's assets and activities are overseen” (Hambrick, 
Werder, & Zajac, 2008). The oversight of managerial activities is grounded in economic 
assumptions that shareholders’ invested wealth needs to be protected and maximized 




Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Departing from traditional agency theory arguments and 
assumptions, I ascribe more importance to social issue shareholders an  the protection 
and maximization of the “social wealth” generated within the firm. Existing research 
building on stakeholder theory has attempted to impact corporate governance 
mechanisms in order to harmonize them with the needs of social-issue shar holders. 
The results of this study confirm that stakeholder activism yields changes within the 
stakeholder governance mechanisms within the firm which are distinct from traditional 
corporate governance mechanisms. This implies that in order to achieve stakeholder-
centric goals, corporate governance could even be supplanted with stakeholder-centric 
governance mechanisms.  
In this dissertation, I also introduced the role of managers as the key decision-
makers of the strategy involving CSP. Past research has surprisingly often assumed 
away this important stakeholder within the organization when investigating CSP as an 
outcome. Drawing upon managerial discretion theory (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) I 
argued that the impact of managers on strategic decisions impacting CSP is stronger in 
certain organizational and environmental contexts. To test these hypotheses, I 
introduced contexts identified in prior research in which managers are known to 
exercise more discretion, as moderators of relationships between stakeholder pressure 
and stakeholder governance mechanisms. The results indicate that not only do managers 
matter, but also they counteract the pressures exerted by stakeholders. In munificence 
markets, managers possess greater managerial discretion and cou ter stakeholder 




Social-issue proponents need to remain alert to the reality that a stronger management 
may often not subscribe to the stakeholder point of view and may even “push back”.    
The results of this study also inform empirical research on the CSP-CFP 
relationship. As explained in the dissertation, researchers have exhibit d substantial 
interest in examining the CSP-CFP relationship and for the last 20 years there seems to 
have been a series of studies aimed at determining the exact nature of his relationship. 
Based on empirical research on the topic, the dominant view has gravitated towards the 
acceptance of a mild positive relationship between CSP and CFP (Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
Concurrently, researchers have noted that the results derived from most e pirical 
investigations may be suspect because researchers often used invalid or unreliable 
measures of CSP and CFP (Van Beurden & Gössling, 2008), failed to control for 
relevant variables (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000), and made weak arguments of causality 
leading to statistically incorrect estimates plus possibly flawed inferences (Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003; Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002). To ensure that my analysis did not suffer 
from such problems I included all identified variables in econometric models to avoid 
endogeneity issues, maintained temporal separation between predictor and dependent 
variables to avoid potential problems of reverse causality, and ruled out alternate 
explanations by using rigorous analytical techniques. Despite having sufficient 
empirical power to detect and effect, the results of my investigation yielded a 
statistically insignificant main effect of CSP on CFP. The results do not change when I 
use alternate measures of financial performance. In recent resarch, other scholars have 




the CSP-CFP relationship turns out to be a statistically insignificant one and not a mild 
positive one (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010; Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock, 2010). 
However, even recent research did not consider the possibility of the results 
being impacted by a sample selection problem. In this study, I corrected the 
endogeneity problem arising due to sample selection which is inherent in studies which 
use only those firms whose ratings are reported by KLD to investigate the CSP-CFP 
relationship. The results in my dissertation indicate that the relationship between CSP 
and market based financial performance is indeed positive and statistically significant 
once sample selection bias is removed. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the 
first to draw researchers’ attention towards a possible sample selection bias that exists 
in estimating the CSP-CFP relationship and the problem of generalizing conclusions 
based on studies of only those firms which are selected by KLD to rep rt  CSP 
rankings. Future research would benefit from ensuring that samples are not biased 
before proceeding with an estimation of the CSP-CFP relationship. 
Implications for Stakeholders 
Stakeholders’ demands expressed through shareholder proposals comprise a 
wide gamut but surprisingly, demands for the design and implementation of governance 
mechanisms that align managers’ interests with those of social-issue stakeholders is 
almost non-existent (Sjöström, 2008). The results of this study indicate that corporate 
compliance takes many forms, one of which is the creation of stakeholder-centric 
governance mechanisms within the firm. In the absence of concrete evid nce linking 
stakeholder pressure with CSP, stakeholders desirous of achieving progress on social 




change of governance structures within the firm to bring them in line with the interests 
of stakeholders. Such stakeholder governance structures can in turn help managers 
navigate the conflicting pressures of wealth maximizing shareholders and social-issue 
stakeholders. 
Recent rule changes by the SEC allow stakeholders an unprecedented influ nce 
over who to appoint to the board of directors of public corporations (Holzer & Berman, 
2010). Stakeholders should find themselves even more empowered to bring about social 
change by advocating the appointment of stakeholder sympathetic members with related 
qualifications to the board of directors. Such directors can in turn influence 
organizational policy for the betterment of stakeholders by monitorig managerial 
actions and ensuring that managerial motives are aligned with those of stakeholders. 
Implications for Managers  
 The results of this dissertation also has implications for managers. Stakeholders 
are key to the success of any organization (Greening & Turban, 2000). Granted, the 
modern corporation has come to ascribe an inordinate importance to wealth-
maximization objectives, managers need to stay cognizant of the needs of social-issue 
stakeholders. Eliciting positive inputs from important stakeholders requires addressing 
those issues which are salient to stakeholders. Therefore, executives may need to check 
the impulsive reaction of working against the will of stakeholders in an effort to retain 
their own discretion (David et al., 2007) and allow structural changes within the 
organization that may facilitate stakeholder welfare.   
 Another implication for managers is that social and environmental issues have 




directors is taking it upon themselves to oversee the organization’s performance in these 
areas. Many large US corporations have begun to institute governanc  mechanisms 
which are intended to safeguard stakeholder interests within the firm. According to a 
recent report, formal board oversight of CSP exists at 65% of the S&P 100 and about a 
fifth of the Russell 1000 member companies (Freeman & Bennette, 2010). Experts are 
increasingly advising organizations to drop a reactive stance ad adopt a more 
integrated approach to CSP by including social-issue considerations in strategic 
decision-making at the top of the organization (Spitzeck, 2010). Amidst societal 
pressures, the board of directors could be compelled to couple CEO incentives or even 
pay to not only the attainment of a financial competitive advantage but also the 
achievement of social performance. Managers are therefore well-advised to adopt a 
proactive stance to handling social and environmental issues within their own sphere of 
influence.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
In this study, I have used social-issue proposals to proxy for stakeholder 
pressure though admittedly, stakeholders adopt a wide variety of pressures mechanisms. 
Recent events lend credence to the notion that disenfranchised stakeholders adopt 
activism through proposals as a means of voicing their opinions. Fishermen from the 
Gulf of Mexico affected by BP’s oil spill purchased shares in the corporation to be 
eligible to participate in the annual shareholder meeting (Webb & McVeigh, 2011). 
Focusing only on stakeholder proposals therefore provides theoretical and empirical 
clarity to the arguments raised within this dissertation and the results obtained from the 




stakeholder pressure should be treated with caution. Future research could benefit by 
replicating this line of inquiry using the oft-researched informal eans of stakeholder 
pressure, such as boycotts, petitions and other social movements (Davis et al., 2005).  
While I did find evidence of structural changes in the form of exist nce of 
committees and overall quality of stakeholder governance measures, there were no 
statistically significant evidence of stakeholder pressure scceeding in appointing more 
stakeholder sympathetic members to stakeholder committees. A possible explanation 
could be the lack of statistical power to detect the effect. Because logistic regression 
uses maximum-likelihood estimates, many researchers believe that such estimation 
requires fairly large samples (Long, 1997). Future research could benefit from 
collecting more data and defining the stakeholder sympathetic members more narrowly 
to achieve more variance in the dependent variable. Another possibility would be to 
collect data at intervals so a more longitudinal sample can be constructed. A 
compilation of committee composition over time would enable researchers to model 
any effects of time trends on board composition. Recent rules changes by the SEC 
allowing stakeholders to directly appoint directors to the board maybe another 
institutional change that may affect the phenomena.  
I adopted the traditional agency-theoretic view of managers having divergent 
predilections than the shareholders of the firm. The creation of stakeholder-centric 
committees indicates at least some acceptance on the part of managers to stakeholder 
demands. Prior research indicates that managerial actions in thedomain of corporate 
governance mechanisms may be only “window-dressing” to placate stockholders 




response is “symbolic rather than substantive” (David et al., 2007: 98). Future research 
could undertake an inquiry along similar lines based on the results of this dissertation. 
For example, researchers could look in a more fine-grained way into managerial actions 
of shaping stakeholder-centric governance structures in response to stakeholder 
activism. Research could explore whether such changes indeed yield substantive 
improvements in corporate social performance or they are still symbolic actions by 
managers intended to deflect stakeholder demands.  
Another limitation of this study is that the data used for analysis is comprised of 
only US firms. Future research could enhance the generalizability of the theory 
presented in this dissertation by replicating it in other countries with different  
institutional settings. A promising area of future research could be the test of the theory 
presented in this dissertation in countries which espouse relatively more stakeholder-
protective views and where managers exercise limited discretion. Because of the 
existing corporate laws, rules and regulations, stakeholder issues and demands are 
different in the US than in other countries. Similarly, corporate governance mechanisms 
vary according to the constraints imposed due to country-level institutions (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003). Crossland and Hambrick (2007) find that managerial discretion too 
varies across institutional contexts. For example, they find that in  country such as 
China which is known to espouse collectivist values (Redding, 1993), managers 
exercise less discretion.  If the results of replicated studies vary across different 
discretion-limiting contexts, one could argue that there are multiple boundary 




provide more insights into the success of activism on social issues in emerging market 
contexts.  
Conclusion  
 Past research has largely focused on improvements in CSP as an outcome of 
stakeholder activism. Because of mixed findings, researchers have implicitly assumed 
that stakeholder activism is unsuccessful in bringing about changes within the 
organization. In this dissertation I focused on changes in stakeholder gov rnance 
mechanisms within the firm as a possible outcome of stakeholder pressure. I confirmed 
that stakeholder pressure exerted through social-issue proposals directed at corporations 
results is associated with the existence of stakeholder-centric committees within the 
board of directors, and improvements in weaknesses of stakeholder governance 
mechanisms. I also introduced the role of managers exercising dicretion of design and 
change in stakeholder governance mechanisms. Managers exercise their discr tion in 
uncertain environments by blocking  improvements in stakeholder governanc  
mechanisms. Stakeholder governance mechanisms partially mediate the r lationship 
between stakeholder pressure and CSP such that at least 20% of the effect is mediated. 
In a re-investigation of the relationship between CSP and financial performance, I found 
that once all methodological corrections are employed the CSP and financial 
performance relationship is statistically insignificant. However I was able to confirm 
that the relationship between CSP and market-based financial performance suffers from 
a sample-selection bias. Upon removal of this bias from estimates, th  relationship 
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